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Abstract  
 This	dissertation	presents	a	case	study	of	the	Zambian	government’s	decision	to	reintroduce	planning	in	2002,	after	having	abandoned	it	a	decade	prior.	African	countries,	and	most	developing	countries,	share	similar	experiences	in	development	planning	–	something	Chimhowu,	Hulme,	and	Munro	refer	to	as	the	‘rise,	fall,	and	return	of	planning’.	The	authors	refer	to	the	most	recent	period	in	the	history	of	development	planning	–	which	became	evident	in	most	emerging	countries	in	the	late-2000s	or	2010s	–	as	the	rise	of	the	‘new’	development	planning.	On	a	broad	level,	the	catalyst	for	the	reintroduction	of	planning	in	Zambia	was	an	aid	harmonisation	process	that	saw	multilateral	and	bilateral	agencies	attempt	to	streamline	aid	inflows	into	recipient	countries,	reduce	the	associated	administrative	costs	for	local	officials,	and	generally	improve	aid	efficacy.	More	specifically,	the	case	study	finds	that	a	particular	confluence	of	economic	ideas	and	political	interests	left	the	government	of	Levy	Mwanawasa	favourably	disposed	to	the	reintroduction	of	planning.	In	this	sense,	the	reintroduction	of	development	planning	formed	part	of	Mwanawasa’s	attempts	to	shore	up	his	legitimacy	among	the	electorate	and	to	build	a	political	coalition	to	withstand	a	powerful	faction	within	his	Movement	for	Multiparty	Democracy	(MMD)	led	by	former	president	Frederick	Chiluba.	This	paper	finds	that	Zambia’s	Fifth	National	Development	Plan	(FNDP)	2006-2010	–	the	first	development	plan	to	be	implemented	since	planning	was	abandoned	in	1991	–	was	heavily	influenced	by	the	Poverty	Reduction	and	Strategy	Paper	(PRSP)	that	preceded	it.	The	PRSP	was	completed	as	a	condition	of	the	multilateral	debt	relief	programme	in	which	Zambia	was	participating	at	the	time.	Significantly,	the	FNDP	did	not	represent	a	return	to	the	developmentalism	that	characterised	the	post-independence	era	of	development	planning.	Rather,	the	FNDP	represented	a	continuation	of	the	‘neoliberal	populism’	introduced	with	the	PRSP.	In	practice,	this	resulted	in	failed	attempts	to	alleviate	some	of	the	costs	of	adjustment	–	such	as	poverty	and	unemployment	–	through	increased	social	sector	spending.	In	short,	the	rise	of	the	‘new’	development	planning	in	Zambia	was	not	accompanied	by	a	corresponding	return	of	any	sort	of	‘new’	developmentalism.			 	
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Preface 	This	dissertation	was	completed	as	part	of	the	requirements	for	a	Master	of	Arts	in	International	Relations	at	the	University	of	Cape	Town.	Due	to	limited	time	and	a	lack	of	funds,	the	study	relied	quite	heavily	on	secondary	sources	but	primary	resources	were	utilised	where	possible.				The	National	Development	Plans	(NDPs)	themselves	were	an	important	primary	resource.	The	foreword	and	introduction	of	all	NDPs	issued	between	1964	and	1991	were	read.	In	most	cases	this	offered	useful	insights,	such	as:	major	objectives,	key	policies,	and	means	of	financing.	A	somewhat	more	in	depth	review	of	the	Fifth	National	Development	Plan	(FNDP)	2006-2010	–	the	first	NDP	to	be	issued	following	the	reinstatement	of	planning	–	was	conducted.	Particular	focus	was	given	here	to	intended	expenditure,	resource	projections,	resource	allocation,	and	means	of	financing.	The	Poverty	Reduction	Strategy	Paper	(PRSP)	2002-2004	was	similarly	analysed	in	a	similar	manner.			The	Medium-Term	Economic	Frameworks	2004-2006	and	2006-2008	were	also	reviewed.		Budget	speeches,	particularly	in	the	early-1990s	and	early-2000s,	also	proved	useful.	Unfortunately,	Zambian	Hansards	for	the	periods	under	study	are	not	available	at	the	university	library	and	could	not	be	accessed	from	other	universities.			Given	the	nature	of	the	research	question	and	the	limited	amount	of	time	available	to	the	researcher,	it	was	decided	that	three	Zambian	technocrats	were	ideally	placed	to	provide	first-hand	knowledge	of	the	political	and	technical	dynamics	surrounding	the	reintroduction	of	planning	in	the	early-2000s.	These	officials	are:			
• Moses	Banda	–	Special	Economic	Advisor	to	President	Mwanawasa,	2002-2007	
• Ng’andu	Peter	Magande	–	Minister	of	Finance,	2003-2008	
• Situmbeko	Musokotwane	–	Permanent	Secretary	to	the	Treasury	(in	Ministry	of	Finance),	2003-2006;	also	Minister	of	Finance,	2008-2011		Moses	Banda	responded	to	questions	from	the	researcher	via	email.	He	gave	the	researcher	permission	for	his	name	and	responses	to	be	used	in	this	study.		Magande	declined	to	be	interviewed,	instead	referring	the	researcher	to	his	autobiography.1	Musokotwane,	currently	a	member	of	parliament,	could	not	be	reached	despite	several	attempts.			
 
1 Ng’andu Peter Magande, The depth of my footprints (Atlanta: Maleendo & Company, 2018 ). 
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Unfortunately,	key	figures	have	since	passed	away.	These	include:	ex-Presidents	Frederick	Chiluba	and	Levy	Mwanawasa	and	former	Finance	Ministers	Emmanuel	Kasonde	and	Ronald	Penza.		
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Chapter	One	
Introduction		
 National	development	planning	has	enjoyed	something	of	a	revival	of	late.	In	a	2019	article,	Chimhowu,	Hulme,	and	Munro	describe	the	re-emergence	of	what	they	call	the	‘new’	development	planning.2	According	to	the	authors,	the	number	of	countries	with	a	national	development	plan	increased	from	62	in	2006	to	134	in	2018.3	This	trend	is	remarkable	given	that	national	development	planning	was	considered	a	moribund	concept	during	the	1980s	and	early	1990s	by	most	development	practitioners.	The	term	‘development	planning’	appeared	to	have	almost	completely	disappeared	from	development	discourse	during	the	same	period.	This	was	in	stark	contrast	to	the	heyday	of	planning	in	the	1960s	and	early	1970s,	when	planning	held	pride	of	place	in	development	economics.		Chimhowu	et	al.’s	findings	indicate	a	clear	trend	that	they	refer	to	as	“the	rise,	fall,	and	return	of	national	planning”.4	On	the	whole,	the	return	of	development	planning	does	not	seem	to	have	garnered	significant	academic	interest.	But	a	few	reports	do	seem	to	support	the	idea	that	governments	are	attempting	to	assert	greater	control	over	their	countries’	development	efforts.	In	2007,	the	World	Bank	published	a	report	on	what	it	called	‘results-based	national	development	strategies’.5	And	in	2019,	the	International	Monetary	Fund	(IMF)	produced	a	working	paper	on	industrial	policy,	entitled	“The	Return	of	the	Policy	That	Shall	Not	Be	Named”.6		The	United	Nations	Economic	Commission	for	Africa	(UNECA)	has	issued	at	least	three	reports	that	support	Chimhowu	et	al.’s	findings	about	planning	on	the	African	continent.7	These	reports	suggest	that	the	fortunes	of	development	planning	in	Africa	mirror	the	global	trend	described	by	Chimhowu	et	al.		
 
2 Admos O Chimhowu, David Hulme, and Lauchlan T Munro, "The ‘new’ national development 
planning and global development goals: Processes and partnerships," World Development 120 (2019). 
3 Ibid., 76. 
4 Ibid., 79. 
5 Janet Entwistle, "Results-Based National Development Strategies: Assessment and Challenges 
Ahead," (Washington, DC: World Bank 2007). 
6 Reda Cherif and Fuad Hasanov, "The Return of the Policy That Shall Not Be Named: Principles of 
Industrial Policy," in Working Paper No. 19/74 (International Monetary Fund, 2019).   
7 AAG Ali, "Development Planning in Africa: Key Issues, Challenges and Prospects," (Addis Ababa: 
United Nations Economic Commission for Africa, 2011); United Nations Economic Commission for 
Africa, "Urbanization and National Development Planning in Africa," (Addis Ababa, Ethiopia: 
UNECA, 2017); "Planning for Africa’s development: Lessons, insights and messages from past and 
present experiences," (Addis Ababa: UNECA, 2016). 
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The	rise,	fall,	and	return	of	planning	on	the	continent	are	part	of	broader	shifts	in	the	ideology	and	practice	of	development.	Broadly	speaking,	these	shifts	correlate	with	four	general	periods	of	development:			
• Post-independence	national	development	planning	–	late-1950s,	1960s,	and	early-1970s	
• Structural	adjustment	and	stabilisation	–	1980s	and	early-1990s	
• Poverty	reduction	strategies	–	late-1990s	and	early-2000s	
• ‘New’	national	development	planning	–	mid-2000s	and	2010s		In	the	late-1950s,	1960s,	and	early	1970s,	thirty-six	newly	independent	African	countries	implemented	–	or	at	least	intended	to	implement	–	national	development	planning.8	At	least	thirty	African	states	implemented	structural	adjustment	and	stabilisation	programmes	in	the	1980s	and	early-1990s.9	In	the	early-2000s,	twenty-nine	countries	on	the	continent	implemented	Poverty	Reduction	and	Strategy	Papers	(PRSPs).10	Beginning	in	the	mid-2000s	and	continuing	into	the	following	decade,	at	least	forty	African	countries	issued	‘new’	development	plans.11		(See	Table	1)			
Table	1:	The	rise,	fall,	and	return	of	planning	in	Africa	
Plan	Type		 Period		 Countries	
National	development	planning		 Late-1950s,	1960s,	early-1970s	 36	Structural	adjustment	and	stabilisation		 1980s,	early-1990s	 30	Poverty	reduction	strategies	 Late-1990s,	early-2000s	 29	‘New’	national	development	planning	 Mid-2000s,	2010s	 40		It	is	difficult	to	get	an	exact	figure	on	the	number	of	countries	that	officially	abandoned	or	suspended	development	planning	during	the	adjustment	era.	Nevertheless,	there	is	reason	to	believe	that	development	planning	effectively	ceased	across	the	continent	as	countries	began	to	roll	back	the	state	and	implement	the	numerous	economic	liberal	reforms	required	by	the	structural	adjustment	packages.		
 
8 Abdelmalek Ben-Amor and Frederick Clairmonte, "Planning in Africa," The Journal of Modern 
African Studies 3, no. 4 (1965). 
9 World Bank, "Adjustment in Africa: reforms, results, and the road ahead " (Washington, D.C.: World 
Bank Group, 1994). 
10 International Monetary Fund, "Zambia: Decision Point Document for the Enhanced Heavily 
Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC) Initiative," (2000). 
11 Chimhowu, Hulme, and Munro, "The ‘new’ national development planning and global development 
goals: Processes and partnerships." 
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For	example,	in	a	2013	blog	post	by	Carlos	Lopez,	the	former	head	of	UNECA	notes	that	the	“second	phase	in	the	evolution	of	planning	in	Africa	was	marked	by	a	wholesale	abandonment	of	planning	under	neoliberal	Structural	Adjustment	Programmes	(SAPs)”.12	Similarly	a	report	published	by	the	UNECA,	for	the	African	Union	Commission	observes	that	the	“advent	of	SAPs,	with	the	accompanied	array	of	conditionalities,	marked	the	end	of	post-independence	attempts	at	development	planning	on	the	continent”.13		What	then	would	explain	the	return	of	development	planning	after	roughly	two	to	three	decades	of	disuse?	This	question	will	be	answered	with	respect	to	a	case	study	of	development	planning	in	Zambia.	Zambia	is	representative	of	the	wider	continental	trend	in	planning	as	it	officially	abandoned	planning	in	1991,	only	to	reinstate	it	in	2002.			Given	the	dearth	of	literature	on	development	planning	in	recent	decades,	Chimhowu	et	al.	appear	to	be	the	only	researchers	to	explicitly	attempt	to	explain	its	return.	Their	most	convincing	argument	is	that	the	PRSPs	have	acted	as	the	direct	antecedents	of	NDPs	in	some	emerging	countries.	As	will	be	explained	in	greater	detail	in	the	next	section,	the	PRSPs	were	introduced	by	the	World	Bank	at	the	end	of	the	millennium	and	afforded	a	greater	–	but	still	limited	–	role	to	states	in	their	development	efforts.	PRSPs	became	one	of	the	key	conditions	of	the	Heavily	Indebted	Poor	Countries	(HIPC)	Initiative	debt-relief	programme.	Chimhowu	et	al.	state	that	the	PRSPs	acted	as	a	sort	of	precursor	to	the	emergence	of	new	development	planning.	As	they	observe,	at	least	fifty-two	of	the	sixty-three	countries	that	implemented	PRSPs	have	subsequently	implemented	some	type	of	new	NDP.14			The	argument	that	the	PRSPs	marked	the	recent	resurgence	of	planning	does	appear	elsewhere.	Ali,	for	example,	states	that	“it	is	possible	to	trace	the	date	of	a	renewed	recognition	of	the	importance	of	the	planning	approach	to	effecting	development	in	the	poor	countries	of	the	world	to	1999.”15	1999	was	the	year	that	the	World	Bank	and	International	Monetary	Fund		–	henceforth	referred	to	as	the	Bretton	Woods	Institutions	(BWIs)	–	linked	PRSPs	to	HIPC	debt	relief.			Simultaneously,	in	the	early-2000s,	bilateral	agencies	were	beginning	to	focus	on	aid	harmonisation	as	a	means	to	increase	aid	efficiency	and	efficacy.	These	efforts	led	to	the	Paris	Declaration	on	Aid	Effectiveness	in	2005,	which	–	among	
 
12 Carlos Lopes to Africa Cheetah Run: The Former Executive Secretary’s Blog, 2013, 
https://www.uneca.org/es-blog/50-years-development-planning-africa-%E2%80%93-lessons-and-
challenges. 
13 Ali, "Development Planning in Africa: Key Issues, Challenges and Prospects," 2. 
14 Chimhowu, Hulme, and Munro, "The ‘new’ national development planning and global development 
goals: Processes and partnerships," 81. 
15 Ali, "Development Planning in Africa: Key Issues, Challenges and Prospects," 9. 
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other	things	–	committed	to	aligning	development	assistance	with	national	development	strategies.	This	is	confirmed	by	Nakase	when	he	claims,	in	2007,	that:		
In	search	of	aid	effectiveness,	it	has	become	common	in	[African]	countries	
for	government	agencies,	donors	and	other	aid	agencies	to	align	their	
activities	and	support	to	comprehensive	national	or	sector	development	
plans	or	strategies.16		Similarly,	James	Mulungushi	–	the	Zambian	technocrat	who	oversaw	both	Zambia’s	PRSP	and	FNDP	–	claims	that	there	had	been:			
[A]	realization	that	the	abolition	of	NCDP	[Zambia’s	central	planning	body]	
by	government	was	a	mistake.	This	is	evident	from	public	statements	from	
government	itself,	the	donor	community,	civil	society,	the	opposition	and	
consultants	engaged	in	restructuring	government	organs.17		According	to	Mulungushi,	the	abolition	of	planning	led	to	increased	administrative	costs	for	Zambian	officials,	misallocation	of	funds,	delays	in	implementation,	and	overall	project	failure.	This	statement	was	echoed	by	President	Levy	Mwanawasa	in	the	foreword	to	the	FNDP,	when	he	cited	the	following	consequences	of	the	abolition	of	planning	in	the	early-1990s:		
• No	planning	framework	to	serve	as	a	basis	for	cooperation	with	donors;	 	
• Weakened	capacity	of	the	country	to	coordinate	national	development	
programmes.18		According	to	Mulungushi	and	Mwanawasa	then,	the	reason	for	the	reintroduction	of	planning	was	the	realisation	–	on	the	part	of	local	technocrats	and	international	aid	agencies	–	that	the	abolition	of	planning	had	undermined	the	efficacy	of	aid	coming	into	the	country.	This	in	turn,	reportedly	had	negative	repercussions	for	the	country’s	development.			Fraser	would	probably	agree	with	this	assessment,	as	he	states	that	by	“2002	both	Zambia	and	its	donors	had	identified	the	absence	of	a	plan	as	a	central	
 
16 Takafumi Nakase, "A Review of the FNDP, PDP and DDP Development Processes," (Tokyo: Japan 
International Cooperation Agency, 2007), iv. 
17 James Shamilimo Mulungushi, "Policy development and implementation in the post-liberalization 
era in Zambia (1990s and beyond): towards a participatory planning and economic management 
model" (University of South Africa, 2009), 239. 
18 Government of the Republic of Zambia, "Fifth National Development Plan," (Lusaka: Ministry of 
Finance and National Planning 2006), i. 
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problem	in	co-ordinating	their	efforts”.19	Fraser	is,	however,	more	explicit	in	stating	that	the	FNDP	was	“conceived	principally	as	a	solution	to	problems	of	aid	management”.20	Zambia	was	still	highly	dependent	on	aid	in	the	first	half	of	the	2000s.	Over	the	period	2000-2005,	aid	averaged	43%	of	the	annual	national	budget	with	a	2001	peak	of	53%.21	Given	Zambia’s	aid	dependency	at	the	time	and	changing	sentiments	regarding	planning,	Fraser’s	assessment	would	appear	to	be	accurate.			Nevertheless,	there	is	reason	to	believe	that	domestic	political	factors	also	had	a	role	to	play	in	the	reinstatement	of	planning.	Mwanawasa	announced	his	intention	to	reinstate	planning	in	January	2002,	several	weeks	after	winning	the	highly	contested	national	polls	in	December	2001.	Mwanawasa	secured	just	29%	of	the	vote,	compared	to	the	27%	of	opposition	candidate	Anderson	Mazoka	of	the	United	Party	for	National	Development	(UPND).	The	numerous	irregularities	in	the	casting,	collection,	and	collation	of	votes	led	many	observers	to	believe	that	Mwanawasa’s	Movement	for	Multiparty	Democracy	(MMD)	had	used	its	access	to	state	resources	to	interfere	in	the	elections.22	As	a	result,	though	Mwanawasa	gained	the	presidency,	he	lacked	political	legitimacy.23	This	was	further	compounded	by	the	fact	that	he	was	only	appointed	as	the	MMD’s	presidential	nominee	approximately	four	months	before	the	2001	elections	took	place.	He	was	appointed	by	then-president	Chiluba	who	had	just	given	up	a	highly	controversial	and	divisive	bid	to	run	for	a	third	term.			Shishuwa	argues	that,	after	winning	the	December	polls,	Mwanawasa	began	to	build	a	coalition	at	political	and	policy	levels,	so	as	to	shore	up	political	support.24	At	the	political	level,	as	he	had	little	support	within	his	own	party,	he	appointed	members	of	the	opposition	to	his	cabinet.	Chief	among	these	was	the	2003	appointment	of	Ng’andu	Peter	Magande,	the	“right-hand	man”	of	the	UPND’s	Mazoka,	as	Finance	Minister.25	At	the	policy	level,	the	recommendation	to	reintroduce	planning	first	appeared	in	the	UPND	2001	election	manifesto.26	The	MMD’s	loss	of	popularity	in	the	2001	elections	was	in	part	due	to	the	widespread	disaffection	with	the	liberalisation	of	the	1990s.	According	to	
 
19 A Fraser, "Zambia: Back to the future? Managing Aid Dependency Project," (Global Economic 
Governance Programme Working Paper 2007/30, 2007), 28. 
20 Ibid. 
21 Government of the Republic of Zambia, "Zambia: Aid Policy and Strategy " (Lusaka Ministry of 
Finance and National Planning 2005), 10. 
22 Peter Burnell, "Zambia's 2001 elections: the tyranny of small decisions,'non-decisions' and'not 
decisions'," Third World Quarterly 23, no. 6 (2002). 
23 Marja Hinfelaar and Justine Sichone, "The challenge of sustaining a professional civil service amidst 
shifting political coalitions: The case of the Ministry of Finance in Zambia, 1991-2018," (Effective 
States and Inclusive Development Working Paper No. 122, 2019). 
24 Sishuwa Sishuwa, interview with author, 11 July 2019, Cape Town 
25 Hinfelaar and Sichone, "The challenge of sustaining a professional civil service amidst shifting 
political coalitions: The case of the Ministry of Finance in Zambia, 1991-2018," 13. 
26 United Party for National Development, "Election Manifesto," (2001), 2. 
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Sishuwa,	co-opting	one	of	the	UPND’s	main	policies	allowed	Mwanawasa	to	establish	some	level	of	political	legitimacy	while	simultaneously	undermining	the	main	opposition	party.27	Moses	Banda,	special	economic	advisor	to	Mwanawasa	between	2002	and	2007,	would	appear	to	support	argument	when	he	states	that:		
In	the	campaigns	towards	the	[2001]	presidential	elections	the	opposition	
parties	took	issue	with	economic	reforms	…	Thus	the	introduction	of	
economic	planning	was	an	intervention	to	address	those	concerns.28		This	argument	will	be	continued	in	Chapter	Three,	where	both	the	external	and	internal	drivers	of	the	reinstatement	of	planning	in	Zambia	will	be	discussed	in	more	detail.	In	addition,	Chapter	Three	provides	a	more	in-depth	review	of	both	Zambia’s	PRSP	and	FNDP.		Chapter	Two	explores	the	reasons	why	planning	was	abandoned	in	the	context	of	multiparty	elections	and	a	structural	adjustment	programme.	Essentially,	the	chapter	argues	that	the	abandonment	of	planning	was	collateral	damage	of	the	Chiluba	administration’s	rapid	liberal	economic	reforms.	Like	most	of	the	reform	measures	of	the	time,	the	recommendation	to	abandon	planning	appears	to	have	been	a	condition	–	albeit	a	relatively	minor	one	–	of	the	financial	assistance	that	Zambia	so	desperately	needed	at	the	time.			The	remainder	of	this	chapter	will	flesh	out	the	periodisation	of	planning	in	Africa	in	more	detail.			Chapter	Four	concludes.		
A	brief	history	of	the	ideology	and	practice	of	development	planning	
in	Africa		
We	do	not	really	know	why	some	countries	are	more	dynamic	than	others.	
Some	countries	experience	phases	of	great	activity	in	literature,	painting,	
music,	war	or	religion;	and	dynamism	in	economic	affairs	may	spring	from	
the	same	deep	and	uncharted	sources.	It	is	probably	no	easier	or	more	
difficult	to	plan	an	artistic	renaissance	than	to	plan	economic	development.	
Arthur	Lewis29	
		
 
27 Sishuwa Sishuwa, interview with author, 11 July 2019, Cape Town 
28 Moses Banda, correspondence with author, 14 June 2019  
29 Arthur W. Lewis, Development Planning (London and New York: Routledge, 1965), 11. 
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Post-colonial	planning			Most	newly	independent	African	states	created	some	sort	of	national	development	plan	in	the	1960s.	Planning	was	a	mainstay	of	development	economics	at	the	time	and	was	based	on	the	widely	held	belief	amongst	development	economists	that	growth	required	a	strong	state	to	correct	for	the	failures	of	the	market.	The	term	‘market	failure’	usually	referred	to	structural	rigidities	in	the	economy	that	prevented	either	growth	or	equitable	distribution	of	economic	gains.	Development	economists	at	the	time	believed	that	the	state	was	the	only	agent	that	was	capable	of	implementing	the	necessary	structural	changes	to	the	economy.	Governments	in	developing	countries	would	supposedly	be	able	to	do	this	by	guiding	the	appropriate	means	of	capital	accumulation,	which	essentially	involved	directing	public	investment	to	the	areas	of	the	economy	that	would	stimulate	growth.	As	will	be	discussed	later	in	this	section,	this	capital	allocation	was	always	targeted	at	achieving	some	form	of	industrialisation.				For	former	colonies	gaining	independence	after	World	War	II,	development	planning	became	priority	number	one.	As	a	1969	report	by	the	International	Bank	for	Reconstruction	and	Development	(IBRD)	observed:	“Today	[1969],	the	national	plan	appears	to	have	joined	the	national	anthem	and	the	national	flag	as	the	symbol	of	sovereignty	and	modernity”.30			Nowhere	was	this	more	evident	than	on	the	African	continent,	where	development	planning	was,	arguably,	adopted	more	strongly	than	in	any	other	developing	region	at	the	time.	Indeed,	in	the	early	1960s,	thirty-six	independent	African	countries	created,	or	at	least	attempted	to	create,	a	national	development	plan.31		Although	it	was	based	on	the	received	economic	thinking	of	the	time,	planning	gained	political	significance	for	newly	independent	African	states.	Planning	became	the	mechanism	through	which	African	leaders	would	deliver	on	their	promises	of	nation	building.	A	1965	article	co-authored	by	the	acting	chief	of	the	planning	division	of	the	UNECA	helps	to	explain	this	point:			
Since	the	acquisition	of	independence	the	leit-motiv	[sic]	in	all	development	
plans	has	been	the	elimination	of	the	colonial	legacy,	economic	
decolonisation,	and	the	building	of	a	new	economic	and	social	order	in	
which	growth	assumes	sustained	dimensions	and	new	directions.32	
 
30 Albert Waterston, "Development planning: Lessons of experience," (Washington, D.C.: World Bank, 
1969), 28. 
31 Ben-Amor and Clairmonte, "Planning in Africa," 478. 
32 Ibid., 479. 
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	Despite	its	appeal	to	Africa’s	new	leaders,	development	planning	was	first	practiced	on	the	continent	by	the	colonial	authorities.33	The	British	parliament	passed	the	Colonial	Development	and	Welfare	Act	of	1940.	A	second	version	of	the	Act,	in	1945,	made	a	total	of		£120	million	available	over	a	ten-year	period	(equivalent	to	roughly	£5,820	million	in	2018).	34	Colonial	administrators	were	required	to	create	ten-year	plans	to	indicate	how	the	allocated	funds	–	intended	for	capital	expenditure	–	would	be	spent.	However,	after	the	1947	financial	crisis,	the	Colonial	Office	increasingly	expected	colonial	authorities	to	fund	the	plans	themselves.	These	plans	were	usually	drawn	up	by	civil	servants	and,	on	the	occasions	that	they	were	actually	implemented,	often	focused	on	infrastructure	investment	for	the	large	European-owned	private	companies	operating	in	the	colonies.		After	World	War	II,	France	began	to	implement	four-year	plans	in	all	of	its	territories.	It	would	issue	two	sets	of	plans	before	abandoning	the	exercise	in	the	middle	of	the	third	plan	(1958-1962)	as	it	began	to	grant	independence	to	its	colonies.	These	plans	were	largely	funded	through	two	mechanisms	created	in	1946	for	the	purpose	–	Fonds	d'investissement	pour	le	developpement	economique	
et	social	des	territoires	d'outremer	and	Caisse	centrale	de	la	france	d'outremer.	Between	1947	and	1958,	Paris	reportedly	dispersed	770,000	million	French	francs	to	its	colonies,	95%	of	which	is	believed	to	have	gone	to	Africa.35		Although	planning	was	widespread	in	the	1950s	and	1960s,	finding	a	definition	was	problematic.	As	Arthur	Lewis	observed	in	1965:			
Since	the	end	of	Second	World	War	most	countries	of	Asia,	Africa	and	Latin	
America	have	published	one	or	more	‘Development	Plans’.	These	Plans	differ	
so	much	in	structure	and	content	that	the	title	‘Development	Plan’	no	longer	
conveys	a	meaning.36		Lewis	proposed	five	elements	that,	individually	or	collectively,	would	constitute	a	development	plan:		 1) A	review	of	the	current	economic	climate;	2) A	list	of	intended	public	investments;	3) A	discussion	of	potential	private	sector	development;		4) A	macroeconomic	projection	of	the	economy;	
 
33 Frederick Cooper, "Modernizing bureaucrats, backward Africans, and the development concept," in 
International development and the social sciences: Essays on the history and politics of knowledge, ed. 
Frederick Cooper and Randall M Packard (University of California Press Berkeley, 1997). 
34 Ben-Amor and Clairmonte, "Planning in Africa," 474. 
35 Ibid., 475. 
36 Lewis, Development Planning, 1. 
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5) An	overview	of	government	policies.37		At	its	most	basic,	development	planning	is	about	setting	objectives	for	a	country	and	defining	the	means	by	which	these	would	be	achieved.38	These	objectives	effectively	constitute	the	ideal	type	of	structural	economic	transformation	as	envisioned	by	the	leaders	of	a	particular	nation.	In	order	to	achieve	the	desired	socio-economic	transformation,	plans	need	to	allocate	scarce	resources	towards	the	established	development	priorities.	Therefore,	as	noted	in	a	2016	UNECA	report,	development	planning	can	be	defined	as	“outlining	strategies	and	priorities	aimed	at	ensuring	the	optimal	allocation	and	use	of	resources”.39	A	defining	feature	of	development	planning	is	the	delineation	of	the	investments	and	capital	expenditure	over	an	extended	period	of	time	that	are	expected	to	yield	future	economic	and	social	gains.	Development	planning	diverts	some	resources,	which	would	have	otherwise	been	used	for	current	production	and	consumption,	towards	long-term	investments.	For	many	newly	independent	African	nations,	this	capital	expenditure	increased	state	capacity	through	investments	in	infrastructure	and	in	the	transport,	communication,	health,	and	education	sectors.			It	is	also	worth	noting	that	planning	consists	of	more	than	producing	a	national	document	–	it	requires	state	policy-making	capacity	in	the	forms	of	personnel,	bureaucracy,	and	institutions.	Helleiner,	therefore,	offers	the	following	clarification:		
The	planning	function	of	achieving	co-ordination	and	rationality	in	the	
pursuit	of	developmental	goals	must	therefore	not	be	regarded	simply	as	a	
matter	of	plan	preparation,	or	of	the	enlargement	and	empowering	of	a	
planning	ministry.	Such	are	important	only	to	the	extent	that	they	
contribute	to	the	effective	performance	of	the	planning	function.	More	
fundamental	are	the	institutions,	practices,	and	procedures	through	which	
the	daily	decision-making	of	governments	is	conducted,	and	the	tools	and	
expertise	available	to	the	individual	actors	within	them.40		Botswana	offers,	arguably,	the	best	example	on	the	continent	of	a	country	where	planning	was	fully	integrated	into	the	national	policy-making	structure.	The		Ministry	of	Development	Planning,	later	to	be	combined	with	the	Ministry	of	Finance	as	the	Ministry	of	Finance	and	Development	Planning	(MFDP),	was	created	in	1966.	The	MFDP	was	situated	in	the	Office	of	the	Vice	President	and	
 
37 Ibid. 
38 Gerald K Helleiner, "Beyond Growth Rates and Plan Volumes–Planning for Africa in the 1970s," 
The Journal of Modern African Studies 10, no. 3 (1972): 347. 
39 United Nations Economic Commission for Africa, "Planning for Africa’s development: Lessons, 
insights and messages from past and present experiences," 2. 
40 Helleiner, "Beyond Growth Rates and Plan Volumes–Planning for Africa in the 1970s," 348. 
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oversaw	key	sectors	of	the	economy	like	agriculture,	health,	and	education.	The	role	of	the	MFDP	was	to	carry	out	detailed	planning,	identify	development	projects,	and	solicit	funding	from	international	donors.	The	MFDP	quickly	became	one	of	the	most	powerful	ministries	in	the	country,	second	only	to	the	presidency.41	Situating	the	planning	department	within	the	finance	ministry	assured	that	the	national	budgeting	process	would	align	with	NDPs.42	Once	the	parliament	of	Botswana	validated	a	plan,	any	government	spending	outside	of	the	NDP	framework	was	considered	illegal.		Development	planning	can	be	contrasted	with	economic	planning,	which	is	aimed	at	maintaining	or	achieving	certain	economic	targets	in	light	of	changes	to	a	nation’s	current	macroeconomic	or	trade	environment.43	Economic,	or	stabilisation	planning,	is	carried	out	by	developed	and	developing	countries	and	is	geared	towards	achieving	short-term	targets	of	economic	performance.		So	far,	development	planning	has	mostly	been	discussed	in	economic	or	technical	terms.	But,	as	was	briefly	mentioned	earlier,	planning	also	provides	a	certain	political	logic	that	was	exploited	by	Africa’s	independence	leaders.	In	reference	to	Sudan,	shortly	after	independence,	Young	explains:			
Rather	than	being	purely	decorative,	the	bureaucracy	and	its	practices,	
particularly	planning,	served	to	structure	elite	conflict	and	bargaining.	
Plans	were	formulated	over	and	over	again,	because	planning	and	the	
vocabulary	of	economic	development	determined	which	demands	upon	the	
state	were	legitimate.44		Development	planning	also	came	to	serve	as	the	means	through	which	governments	would	assert	their	claim	to	legitimacy.	Young	describes	how	Sudan’s	military	rulers	in	the	late-1950s	and	early-1960s	used	the	advent	of	national	accounting	(the	ability	to	calculate	an	overall	national	income)	to	define	the	goals	by	which	the	legitimacy	of	their	rule	could	be	determined.	This	is	made	clear	by	Young’s	observation	that:		
…	[N]ational	income	accounting	gave	the	authors	and	the	policy-makers	
who	depended	on	these	accounts	a	new	social	object:	the	nation,	in	whose	
 
41 Ian Taylor, "Botswana’s developmental state and the politics of legitimacy," in Global Encounters 
(Springer, 2005). 
42 Government of the Republic of Botswana, "National Development Plan Seven 1991-1997," 
(Gaborone: Ministry of Finance and Development Planning, 1991). 
43 Helleiner, "Beyond Growth Rates and Plan Volumes–Planning for Africa in the 1970s."; United 
Nations Economic Commission for Africa, "Planning for Africa’s development: Lessons, insights and 
messages from past and present experiences." 
44 Alden Young, "Measuring the Sudanese economy: a focus on national growth rates and regional 
inequality, 1959–1964," Canadian Journal of Development Studies / Revue canadienne d'études du 
développement 35, no. 1 (2014): 45. 
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name	they	could	act.	It	was	the	ability	of	military	leaders	to	claim	that	they	
were	acting	in	the	name	of	the	nation	that	justified	the	abrogation	of	the	
electoral	system	…	45		Development	planning	gave	the	leaders	of	Sudan,	a	massive	country	of	disparate	communities,	the	means	by	which	they	could	justify	their	control	over	the	young	state,	even	if	they	did	not	have	the	support	of	the	majority	of	people	in	whose	interests	they	were	claiming	to	act.				A	similar	sentiment	can	be	found	in	Nigeria’s	Second	National	Development	Plan	1970-1974,	published	in	January	1970	at	the	end	of	the	three-year	Biafran	Civil	War:	
…	[T]he	basic	issues	in	the	country	and	the	character	of	the	civil	war	have	
all	demonstrated	the	political	(as	well	as	economic)	necessity	that	Nigeria	
must	henceforth	remain	a	united	nation	…	The	pursuit	of	a	strong	and	
united	nation,	as	a	fundamental	social	aim,	is	the	very	antithesis	of	
secession	or	the	exploitation	of	ethnic	group,	class	or	similar	sentiments	…	46		In	order	to	achieve	the	sought-after	national	unity,	the	Second	NDP:		 …	[R]ecognizes	explicitly	the	possibilities	of	using	planning	as	a	deliberate	
weapon	of	social	change	by	correcting	defects	in	existing	social	relations	in	
various	spheres	of	production,	distribution	and	exchange.	47		Nigeria’s	Federal	Military	Government	therefore	dedicated	roughly	40%	of	public	sector	investment	in	the	Second	NDP	to	post-war	reconstruction	and	rehabilitation	projects.48		Not	only	does	development	planning	serve	two	types	of	logic,	one	technical	and	the	other	political,	but	these	logics	interact	with	each	other	in	important	ways.		Chakravarty	states	that	in	order	to	adequately	understand	development	planning	in	India,	one	needs	to	address	what	he	describes	as	the	“dialectic	of	accumulation	vs	legitimation”.49	Development	required	growth	and	growth	required	increased	levels	of	production,	employment,	and	income.	In	addition	to	solving	these	technical	problems,	development	planning	also	needed	to	reinforce	the	political	power	of	those	who	uphold	planning.			
 
45 Ibid., 48-49. 
46 As cited in RO Ekundare, "Nigeria's second national development plan as a weapon of social 
change," African affairs 70, no. 279 (1971): 152. 
47 Ibid., 146. 
48 Ibid., 152. 
49 Sukhamoy Chakravarty, Development planning: The Indian experience (New York Oxford 
University Press, 1987). 
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This	interaction	between	accumulation	(or	growth)	and	legitimation	is	ably	described	in	Chatterjee’s	analysis	of	India’s	development	planning	in	the	first	fifteen	years	of	independence:			
A	developmental	ideology,	then,	was	a	constituent	part	of	the	self-definition	
of	the	post-colonial	state.	The	state	was	connected	to	the	people-nation	not	
simply	through	the	procedural	forms	of	representative	government,	it	also	
acquired	its	representativeness	by	directing	a	programme	of	economic	
development	on	behalf	of	the	nation.50		A	state’s	legitimacy	was	therefore	determined	not	only	through	representative	processes,	but	also	by	its	ability	to	act	as	the	custodian	of	the	economic	wellbeing	of	its	citizens.			Similar	to	its	African	counterparts,	India’s	new	leaders	saw	development	planning	as	the	tool	that	they	would	use	to	achieve	post-colonial	structural	transformation	after	independence	in	1947.51	The	National	Planning	Commission,	established	by	Jawaharlal	Nehru	in	1950,	would	come	to	be	the	dominant	institution	in	economic	policy-making	throughout	the	decade.			A	small	disambiguation	is	needed	here.	India’s	approach	to	development	planning	differed	from	that	of	the	majority	of	African	countries.	Development	planning	in	India,	particularly	in	the	latter	half	of	the	1950s,	appears	to	have	been	heavily	influenced	by	Soviet	planning.	The	architect	of	the	Second	Five-Year	Plan	1955-1960,	P.C.	Mahalanobis,	acknowledged	that	he	had	been	influenced	by	Soviet	growth	models	of	the	1920s.52		Similar	to	Soviet	planning,	the	Second	Five-Year	Plan	focused	on	capital	goods	production	or	heavy	industry.	One	of	the	factors	that	led	Indian	planners	towards	this	strategy	was	the	assumption	of	an	essentially	closed	economy.			Most	post-colonial	African	states,	on	the	other	hand,	based	their	industrialisation	strategies	on	the	comparative	advantage	that	defined	their	economies	during	colonialism	–	a	few	key	primary	goods	export	streams.53	While	some	of	the	models	and	theories	used	may	have	differed,	almost	all	African	countries	pursued	some	sort	of	Import	Substitution	Industrialisation	(ISI).54	Safeguarded	by	tariff	and	non-tariff	trade	barriers,	infant	industries	were	most	often	funded	
 
50 Partha Chatterjee, "Development planning and the Indian state," in Politics and the State in India, ed. 
Zoya Hasan (New Delhi: SAGE Publications India, 2000). 
51 Medha Kudaisya, "‘A Mighty Adventure’: Institutionalising the Idea of Planning in Post-colonial 
India, 1947–60," Modern Asian Studies 43, no. 4 (2009). 
52 Chakravarty, Development planning: The Indian experience. 
53 Thandika Mkandawire and Chukwuma C. Soludo, Our continent, our future: African perspectives on 
structural adjustment (Trenton Africa World Press, Inc., 1999), 35. 
54 Lester Bowles Pearson, Partners in Development: Report of the Commission on International 
Development (New York: Praeger Publisher, 1969), 270. 
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by	the	state	through	primary	product	exports	–	either	agricultural	commodities	or	natural	resources.	The	ISI	adopted	by	most	African	countries	was	premised	on	an	open	economy	that	was	fully	integrated	into	world	markets.	The	clearest	exceptions	here	are	Mozambique,	Angola,	and	Cape	Verde	after	independence	in	1975.55			Indian	planning	in	the	1950s	was	obviously	not	identical	to	Soviet	planning	in	the	1920s.	Chakravarty	notes	that	the	Second	Five-Year	Plan	envisioned	the	state-run	capital	goods	sector	existing	side-by-side	with	private	agriculture	and	private	consumer	goods	manufacturing.56	And	Kudaisya	observes	that,	starting	in	the	late	1950s,	the	Ministry	of	Finance	began	to	play	an	increasingly	important	role	in	economic	policy-making	relative	to	the	National	Planning	Commission.57			The	increased	dependence	on	commodities	for	their	export	earnings	further	exposed	the	revenues	of	most	African	states	to	the	volatility	of	international	commodities	market.	This	proved	beneficial	in	the	first	decade	or	so	after	independence,	as	growth	in	industrialised	countries	provided	expanding	markets	for	African	primary	products.	The	result	is	that	growth	for	the	continent	averaged	2.6%	per	year	from	1965	to	1974.58	Most	African	governments	used	the	increased	resources	to	fund	the	infrastructure	and	social	services	that	were	largely	absent	in	the	colonial	era.	The	period	saw	a	rapid	rise	in	roads,	schools,	universities,	hospitals,	and	clinics	across	the	continent.	This	expansion	in	services	was	also	marked	by	the	proliferation	of	state-owned	entities	in	almost	all	sectors	of	the	economy.	While	welcome,	the	modest	growth	in	the	1960s	and	early	1970s	was	fragile.	This	was	made	readily	apparent	by	the	oil	crises	of	the	1970s.			
Structural	adjustment	and	stabilisation	programmes		The	decision	by	oil-producing	countries	to	throttle	production	and	increase	prices	in	1973	triggered	a	global	recession	that	saw	reduced	demand	for	African	commodities	and	increased	interest	rates	for	African	debt.59	African	leaders	on	the	whole,	responded	to	the	resulting	decline	in	terms	of	trade	by	increasing	borrowing	–	often	with	the	express	support	of	the	BWIs	–	to	finance	ongoing	expenditure.	Most	African	countries	had	accrued	unmanageable	current	account	
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deficits	by	the	end	of	the	1970s,	which	were	accompanied	by	a	widespread	drop	in	per	capita	income.60			Many	development	economists	interpreted	Africa’s	declining	fortune	primarily	as	a	result	of	the	failure	of	planning.	For	example,	in	an	article	intended	to	explain	the	so-called	“crisis	in	planning”,	Killick	claimed	that	there	would	“probably	be	little	disagreement	today	[1976]	that	the	practice	of	planning	has	generally	failed	to	bring	many	of	the	benefits	expected	from	it”.61	Several	reasons	were	given	for	the	apparent	failure	of	planning,	including	administrative	failings,	resource	constraints,	and	plan	deficiencies.	Although	legitimate,	Killick	claimed	that	these	explanations	“do	not	get	to	the	source	of	the	problem,	which	is	the	naivety	of	the	implicit	model	of	governmental	decision-making	incorporated	in	the	planning	literature”.62		Kilick’s	reasoning	is	indicative	of	a	wider	ideological	shift	that	was	taking	place	in	the	development	community	at	the	time.	This	shift	began	with	the	rise	of	the	so-called	“second	generation	of	development	economists”	in	the	mid-1970s.63	Meier	explains	the	fundamental	ideological	difference	between	the	two	generations:			
If	the	first	generation	of	development	economists	was	visionary	and	
dedicated	to	grand	theories	and	general	strategies,	the	second	generation	
was	almost	moralistic,	dedicated	to	a	somber	realism	grounded	on	
fundamental	principles	of	neoclassical	economics.64			This	new	development	ideology	came	to	dominate	the	BWIs	by	the	end	of	the	1970s.	The	advice	that	these	organisations	gave	to	recipient	countries	likewise	changed.	Meier	captures	this	quite	succinctly:			
Governments	were	admonished	not	only	to	remove	price	distortions	but	also	
to	"get	all	policies	right."	Not	differences	in	initial	conditions	but	differences	
in	policies	were	now	thought	to	explain	the	disparate	performances	of	
developing	countries.	A	country	was	not	poor	because	of	the	vicious	circle	of	
poverty	but	because	of	poor	policies.	Markets,	prices,	and	incentives	should	
be	of	central	concern	in	policymaking.65		
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The	above	quote	could	also	serve	as	a	summary	of	the	World	Bank’s	Berg	Report	issued	in	1981.66	The	Berg	Report	would	serve	as	the	theoretical	justification	for	the	SAPs	that	would	dominate	the	Bank’s	and	the	Fund’s	lending	to	African	countries	in	the	1980s	and	early-1990s.	Adjustment	thereafter	formed	the	basis	of	the	multilateral	and	bilateral	agencies’	thinking	about	development.67			Moreover,	the	rise	of	SAPs	signalled	the	end	of	the	post-independence	planning	era	for	the	continent.68	This	is	not	to	say	that	SAPs	cannot	be	thought	of	as	plans	in	a	general	sense,	as	they	certainly	outlined	a	state’s	economic	goals	for	the	(near)	future	and	the	policies	that	were	thought	to	achieve	them.	SAPs	can,	however,	be	contrasted	with	development	planning	in	the	sense	that	they	denied	the	state	any	substantive	role	in	the	development	of	the	economy,	or	at	least	attempted	to	keep	the	role	of	the	state	in	economic	development	to	an	absolute	minimum.	SAPs	presented	a	markedly	different	view	of	what	the	state	could	and	should	do.	As	Mkandawire	observes:	“The	state,	once	the	cornerstone	of	development,	became	the	millstone	around	otherwise	efficient	markets”.69		A	sizeable	literature	–	most	of	it	quite	critical	–	has	amassed	concerning	Africa’s	experience	of	structural	adjustment.70	Therefore	a	brief	summary	of	the	relevant	points	will	be	presented	here.71	The	ideology	behind	SAPs	is	often	referred	to	as	the	Washington	Consensus,	although	this	term	only	came	into	use	in	1989.72	The	Washington	Consensus	emphasised	internal	(i.e.	domestic)	explanations	of	the	poor	economic	performance	of	many	developing	countries.	The	African	economic	crisis	that	began	in	the	1970s	was	considered	to	be	the	result	of	policy	failure	and	excessive	government	intervention.	Developing	countries	were	advised	to	reign	in	the	state	as	much	as	possible,	leaving	just	enough	capacity	to	provide	the	institutions	necessary	for	the	functioning	a	free	market.	Sometimes	referred	to	as	market	fundamentalism,	this	was	accompanied	by	an	emphasis	on	macroeconomic	stability	and	fiscal	responsibility	(or	perhaps	more	accurately,	conservatism).	
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	Due	to	sizeable	debt,	shrinking	foreign	exchange	earnings,	and	growing	fiscal	deficits,	African	leaders	were	not	in	a	strong	negotiating	position	to	resist	the	BWIs’	insistence	on	“getting	the	policies	right”.	The	World	Bank’s	policy	recommendations	usually	consisted	of	three	areas	of	reform.73	The	first	focused	on	trade	liberalisation.	The	second	concerned	macroeconomic	policies	to	decrease	fiscal	deficits,	reduce	inflation,	and	ensure	competitive	exchange	rates.	The	third	area	of	reforms	concerned	opening	up	the	domestic	economy	through	deregulation,	including	the	removal	of	price	controls	and	liberalisation	of	the	labour	market.					A	1994	World	Bank	study	noted	that	at	least	thirty	African	countries	had	implemented	SAPs	between	the	mid-1980s	and	early-1990s.74	The	World	Bank	study	excluded	small	and	island	nations	and	those	that	were	experiencing	conflict	at	the	time.	Indeed,	Loxley	states	that	just	fewer	than	forty	African	countries	received	stabilisation	and/or	adjustment	loans	from	the	IMF	and/or	World	Bank	in	the	1980s.75			The	economic	crisis	that	preceded	SAPs	was	certainly	severe.	As	Callaghy	observes:	“By	the	early	1980s,	the	situation	had	become	catastrophic.	For	much	of	the	continent	output	per	head	was	lower	than	in	1960”76.	SAPs	were	intended	to	halt	the	economic	decline	and	facilitate	growth	in	the	short-term.	Callaghy	goes	on	to	say	that	“such	adjustment,	planned	or	unplanned,	imposed	or	voluntary,	is	a	dramatic,	difficult,	and	unsettling	phenomenon”.77	Nevertheless	–	and	although	some	form	of	adjustment	was	likely	required	in	most	African	economies	–	SAPs	would	prove	to	be	particularly	unsettling.				In	a	1994	report	entitled	Adjustment	in	Africa,	the	World	Bank	asked	“Is	adjustment	paying	off	in	Sub-Saharan	Africa?”78	To	which	it	claims	that	the	“answer	is	a	qualified	yes”.	The	report	claimed	that	the	six	–	out	of	twenty-nine	countries	studied	–	that	had	improved	macroeconomic	policy-making	had	seen	a	corresponding	increase	in	growth.		The	report	then	concludes	that	“adjustment	policies	work	when	implemented	properly”.79	This	report	has,	however,	been	heavily	criticised.	Schatz,	for	example,	finds	fault	with	the	methods	used.	Schatz	
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finds	that	the	evidence	presented	by	the	World	Bank,	in	fact,	suggests	that	structural	adjustment	may	have	impeded	growth	on	the	continent.80		A	1996	article,	Lal	similarly	questions	the	findings	in	Adjustment	in	Africa.81	Lal	conducted	a	study	of	forty-five	African	countries	–	sixteen	of	which	did	not	undergo	adjustment	–	using	data	from	the	World	Bank	and	African	Development	Bank.	Countries	were	grouped	using	the	same	classifications	as	Adjustment	in	
Africa	into	those	with	improved	and	those	with	deteriorating	policies.	Lal	found	that	countries	with	improved	macroeconomic	policies	experienced	higher	growth	rates	than	those	with	deteriorating	policies	or	those	that	were	not	implementing	adjustment.	The	difference	in	growth	rates	was,	however,	not	statistically	significant.	Lal	therefore	concludes	that,	while	macro-economic	policies	are	important	for	growth,	the	performance	difference	between	groups	was	likely	caused	by	other	factors.				Apart	from	criticising	the	results	of	SAPs,	several	observers	questioned	the	logic	of	SAPs	as	a	precursor	to	some	type	of	beneficial	development	outcome.	Writing	in	1992,	Hellleiner	argued	that	by	focusing	solely	on	short-term	economic	performance,	SAPs	undermined	the	continent’s	long-term	development	prospects.82	Most	countries	that	had	implemented	SAPs	saw	a	subsequent	increase	in	poverty	and	income	inequality.83		Disaffection	with	adjustment	was	growing	across	the	continent.	As	a	2002	report	by	the	United	Nations	Conference	on	Trade	and	Development	(UNCTAD)	observed:			
Africa	has	seen	the	most	intense	and	recurrent	application	of	structural	
adjustment	programmes	over	the	past	two	decades	without	making	much	
progress	in	either	poverty	alleviation	or	development.84		
	
The	Poverty	Reduction	Strategy			Eventually,	the	World	Bank	appeared	to	acknowledge	that	the	Washington	Consensus	needed	to	be	amended,	when	it	released	the	Comprehensive	Development	Framework	in	1999.85	The	framework	explicitly	adopted	poverty	reduction	as	an	end	goal	of	development.	It	also	laid	the	foundation	for	the	programme	that	would	define	the	BWIs’	relationship	with	the	developing	
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countries	in	the	new	millennium	–	the	Poverty	Reduction	Strategy.	The	thinking	behind	this	is	sometimes	referred	to	as	the	Post-Washington	Consensus.86			The	World	Bank	and	IMF	established	the	HIPC	Initiative	in	1996	with	the	aim	of	helping	poor	countries	manage	their	debt	burden,	sometimes	through	the	provision	of	debt	relief.	After	a	review	of	the	programme,	an	Enhanced	HIPC	(referred	to	as	HIPC	II)	was	launched	in	December	1999.	HIPC	II	included	several	changes	to	the	initiative,	the	main	one	being	the	introduction	of	PRSPs	as	a	condition	of	debt	relief.	Twenty-nine	African	countries	completed	the	HIPC	II	qualification	process	and	therefore	completed	PRSPs	in	the	early-2000s.87		The	introduction	of	PRSPs	seemed	to	display	recognition	by	the	BWIs	that	development	would	require	a	certain	amount	of	government	intervention.88	Towards	the	end	of	the	1990s,	phrases	like	‘pro-poor	growth’	and	‘inclusive	development’	began	to	enter	the	multilaterals’	lexicon.	This	change	in	thinking	can	be	seen	in	how	the	BWIs	described	what	they	perceived	as	the	key	elements	of	a	PRSP:		
• The	process	for	creating	a	PRSP	should	be	country-led;	
• A	PRSP	should	be	results-or-outcome	orientated;	
• The	scope	of	issues	and	sectors	covered	in	a	PRSP	should	be	comprehensive;	
• The	relationship	between	the	recipient	countries	and	the	BWIs	should	be	take	the	form	of	a	partnership;	
• A	PRSP	should	be	designed	as	a	medium-to-long-term	strategy.89		It	is	important	to	note	that,	despite	a	new	emphasis	on	poverty	reduction,	the	underlying	policy	assumptions	of	the	PRSP	differed	little	from	those	of	structural	adjustment.	As	a	UNCTAD	report	notes,	there	are	effectively	two	main	differences.90	First,	the	PRSP	places	greater	emphasis	on	the	provision	of	social	services	as	it	recognises	that	the	poor	would	not	automatically	feel	the	benefits	of	poverty-reducing	growth.	Second,	it	includes	provision	for	targeted	spending	programmes	–	‘safety	nets’	–	to	mitigate	the	effects	of	austerity	measures.	The	underlying	liberal	economic	thinking	however	has	not	changed:	poverty	can	only	be	tackled	by	growth,	which	can	only	come	about	from	macroeconomic	stability	and	structural	reforms.		
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	Therefore,	despite	the	new	approach,	the	BWIs’	end-goal	had	not	changed.	A	2002	report	by	Bwalya	et	al.	makes	this	clear:			
[PRSPs	were]	considered	…	instrumental	towards	achieving	basically	the	
same	policy	outcomes	–	albeit	more	broadly	and	with	some	modification	–	
that	the	SAPs	had	failed	to	achieve.91	
	Underlining	this	new	approach	to	multilateral	lending	was	the	realisation	that	policy	conditionality	–	making	aid	disbursement	dependent	on	certain	policy	outcomes	–	had	failed	to	bring	about	the	desired	outcomes.92	The	PRSPs	were,	therefore,	informed	by	the	BWIs’	increasing	use	of	process	conditionality.93	This	shift	was	motivated	by	a	realisation	that	politics	affects	policy	outcomes;	that	policies	transplanted	from	abroad	are	unlikely	to	gain	much	traction.	This	would	explain	why	‘national	ownership’	could	probably	be	described	as	the	most	popular	catchphrase	of	the	PRSP	process.	The	BWIs	switched	from	dictating	policy	outcomes	to	dictating	the	processes	by	which	these	policies	would	be	made.	It	was	believed	that	the	new	approach	would	engender	greater	reform	commitment	in	recipient	countries.		
	After	their	introduction,	PRSPs	would	gain	in	importance	for	two	main	reasons.94	First,	they	replaced	the	previous	Policy	Framework	Papers	(PFPs),	as	the	founding	agreements	on	which	adjustment	programmes	would	be	based.	This	is	important	because	almost	all	bilateral	agencies	began	to	alter	their	funding	to	conform	to	the	priorities	laid	out	in	the	PRSPs.	Secondly;	they	accompanied	a	substantive	change	in	the	BWIs’	lending	practices.	Both	the	Fund	and	Bank	changed	their	lending	instruments	in	line	with	the	new	PRSP	focus.	The	IMF	replaced	its	Enhanced	Structural	Adjustment	Facility	(ESAF)	with	the	Poverty	Reduction	and	Growth	Facility	(PRGF).	And	the	Bank	introduced	a	new	line	of	concessional	credit	called	the	Poverty	Reduction	Strategy	Credit	(PRSC).			The	rise	of	the	new	national	planning	followed	in	the	wake	of	the	HIPC	II	Initiative	and	the	PRSPs.	It	is	useful	to	briefly	note	the	main	differences	between	PRSPs	and	NDPs.	Some	observers	refer	to	the	PRSP	as	‘quasi-planning’,	where	government	takes	on	a	limited	role	to	achieve	a	narrowly	defined	goal	in	a	relatively	short	timeframe.95		
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PRSPs	are,	at	their	core,	still	structural	adjustment	programmes	but	with	provisions	for	targeted	spending	programmes	to	ease	the	cost	of	adjustment	borne	by	society’s	most	vulnerable.		In	contrast	the	new	NDPs	adopt	a	longer	time	frame	and	include	more	ambitious	growth	targets	and	wider	social	objectives.	Many	of	the	new	NDPs	are	meant,	at	least	in	theory,	to	achieve	some	level	of	structural	transformation,	often	in	line	with	a	national	long-term	vision	document.	They	attempt	to	do	so	by	stipulating	national	policies	that	are	intended	to	guide	spending	priorities	and	resource	allocation	over	the	NDP	period.	Despite	their	difference,	the	PRSPs	did	act	as	precursors	to	NDPs	in	many	countries	and	as	such	influenced	the	policy-making	process	and	the	content	of	the	new	plans	in	important	ways.	This	will	be	discussed	in	more	detail	in	Chapter	Three.		
New	development	planning			Chimhowu	et	al.	note	several	characteristics	shared	by	new	development	plans	around	the	world.96	Often	referred	to	as	medium-term	plans,	they	span	between	four	and	six	years,	with	the	majority	spanning	five	years.	They	are	often,	but	not	always,	accompanied	by	long-term	national	vision	documents.	These	visions	usually	span	between	twenty	and	thirty	years,	and	define	broad	societal	goals	or	aspirations.	National	development	plans	are	presented	as	the	means	of	operationalising	the	national	vision	and	achieving	more	concrete	and	measurable	medium-term	targets.	In	Zambia’s	case,	the	FNDP	was	launched	alongside	Vision	2030,	which	detailed	the	country’s	ambition	to	be	a	middle-income	country	by	2030.97	The	content	of	the	FNDP	and	the	planning	process	behind	it	will	be	explored	in	greater	detail	in	Chapter	Three.				The	main	differences	between	the	new	NDPs	and	those	of	the	immediate	post-independence	era	was	the	perceived	role	of	the	state	(See	Table	2	for	an	overview	of	the	planning	periods	since	independence).	Most	NDPs	in	the	1960s	and	early	1970s	envisaged	a	central	role	for	the	state	in	driving	economic	growth,	as	witnessed	by	the	prevalence	of	ISI	and	the	growth	in	state-owned	enterprises	at	the	time.	The	new	NDPs	of	the	2000s,	in	contrast,	framed	a	more	reduced	role	for	state.	Public	investment	is	seen	as	necessary	only	to	the	extent	that	it	facilitates	private	investment	and	provides	essential	social	services	to	the	poor.			Another	important	difference	between	the	new	African	NDPs	and	their	post-colonial	predecessors	is	the	extent	to	which	the	former	have	strongly	adopted	
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macroeconomic	orthodoxy.98	The	new	NDPs	will,	for	the	most	part,	still	outline	intended	public	expenditure	but	only	to	the	extent	that	key	macroeconomic	objectives	are	not	violated.	Such	objectives	can	be	seen	in	Zambia’s	FNDP,	for	example:		 1. Inflation	and	interest	rate	reduction;		2. Transparent	debt	contraction	and	management;		3. Effective	public	expenditure	and	revenue	management;		4. Sound	economic	governance	and	transparency;	5. A	stable	and	competitive	exchange	rate.99		
Table	2:	Overview	of	planning	periods	since	independence100	
		 Post-colonial	
NDPs		 SAPs	 PRSPs	 New	NDPs	
Objectives	
Growth			Increase	employment		Infrastructure	investment		Nation	building	–	establish	state	capacity	i.e.	civil	service,	social	services,	etc.		
Restore	conditions	for	growth		Macroeconomic	stability	and	fiscal	responsibility		A	free,	open,	and	competitive	domestic	market		
Growth			Poverty	reduction		
Growth			Reduction	in	poverty	and	unemployment		Human	resources	development	(health	and	education)		Infrastructure	investment	
Main	
policies	
Import	substitution	industrialisation	
Trade,	currency,	and	capital	market	liberalisation		Roll	back	the	state	–deregulation,	privatisation		Control	public	expenditure,	reduce	inflation,	and	contain	fiscal	deficits	
Similar	to	adjustment	but	with	more	spending	on	social	services	and	targeted	spending	programmes	to	alleviate	effects	of	austerity	
Indicative	spending	to	incentivise	private	sector			Capital	allocation	for	public	investment		Targeted	social	sector	spending			
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		 Post-colonial	
NDPs		 SAPs	 PRSPs	 New	NDPs	
Timeframe		 Medium-term	(5-6	years)	 Short-term	(1-3	years)	 Short-to-medium-term	(2-3	years)	 Medium-term	(±5	years)	
Funding	
Domestic	revenue	(mostly	primary	goods	exports)		Technical	assistance	from	bilateral	and	multilateral	agencies		In	some	instances,	grants	from	former	colonial	rulers	
BWI	lending	agreements		Bilateral	aid	agencies	loans	and	grants	
Multilateral	and	bilateral	agencies	loans	and	grants	
Domestic	Revenue		HIPC	and	MDRI	debt	relief	(indirectly)			Multilateral	and	bilateral	agencies	loans	and	grants		To	a	lesser	extent,	domestic	and	external	debt		 	
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Chapter	Two	–	Abandoning	development	planning	in	1991		
Introduction		Multiparty	elections	in	1991	sent	a	signal	to	the	world	that	profound	political	and	economic	changes	were	underway	in	Zambia.	The	MMD’s	Frederick	Chiluba	secured	a	convincing	win	over	the	long-serving	former	president	Kenneth	Kaunda’s	United	National	Independence	Party	(UNIP).	The	MMD’s	widespread	support	was	largely	due	to	the	economic	collapse	the	country	experienced	under	Kaunda’s	twenty-seven-year	rule.		When	the	MMD	came	to	power,	the	economy	was	devastated.	The	economic	decline	begun	in	the	1970s	had	continued	unabated.	For	the	first	decade	after	independence,	annual	growth	averaged	2.4%.101		For	the	next	fifteen	years	leading	up	to	1990,	annual	growth	averaged	0.7%.102		Real	earnings	in	the	formal	sector	reached	a	peak	in	1970	and	by	1975	began	to	decline	sharply.	By	1991,	average	real	earnings	were	at	30%	of	the	1975	level.103		Similarly,	gains	made	since	independence	in	social	indicators	like	school	enrolment,	malnourishment,	and	infant	mortality	were	reversed	between	1976	and	1991.104	At	the	time	of	the	elections,	Zambia	had	the	highest	public	debt	per	capita	of	any	country	in	the	world,	inflation	had	reached	100%,	and	foreign	exchange	stock	had	been	virtually	eliminated.105	Total	debt	had	risen	from	$3,80	billion	in	1983	–	when	government	signed	a	one-year	stand-by	agreement	with	the	IMF	–	to	$7,22	billion	in	1990.106	Over	this	period,	government	had	been	using	between	60%	and	66%	of	its	export	income	to	service	its	debt.107			As	with	many	new	African	governments	in	the	1990s,	the	Chiluba	administration	endorsed	classical	liberal	economic	orthodoxy.	In	order	to	resuscitate	what	was	effectively	a	moribund	economy,	Chiluba’s	MMD	implemented	an	extensive	and	rapid	liberal	economic	reform	programme.	International	lenders	and	bilateral	aid	agencies	welcomed	Zambia’s	new	democratic	dispensation	led	by	committed	reformers.	International	finance	–	grants	and	loans	–	that	had	been	frozen	in	the	
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latter	years	of	the	Kaunda	administration	began	to	flow	again.	On	taking	office,	the	new	MMD	government	abandoned	development	planning	in	favour	of	expenditure	control	and	improved	budget	management.		This	chapter	will	argue	that	national	development	planning	was	a	victim	of	the	thorough	and	rapid	economic	liberalisation	of	the	early-1990s.	Perceived	as	an	instrument	of	state	intervention,	planning	had	no	place	in	the	market-friendly	economy	that	Chiluba’s	MMD	was	implementing	with	the	help	of	its	international	financiers.			This	first	section	of	the	chapter	will	provide	the	historical	context	for	the	abandonment	of	planning.	It	will	do	so	by	providing	a	brief	history	of	development	planning	in	Zambia	from	the	colonial	planning	era	in	the	1940s	and	1950s	to	post-independence	planning	from	the	1960s	to	the	late-1980s.	Following	that,	the	rise	of	opposition	to	Kaunda’s	rule	and	economic	mismanagement	in	the	1980s	will	be	discussed.	This	is	relevant	in	that	it	provides	insight	into	the	players	and	interest	groups	that	would	come	to	form	the	MMD.		The	second	part	of	the	chapter	will	focus	on	the	seminal	political	and	economic	developments	of	the	1990s.	This	provides	a	valuable	frame	of	reference	for	understanding	the	reintroduction	of	planning	by	president	Mwanawasa	in	the	early-2000s	that	will	be	discussed	in	Chapter	Three.			The	third	section	of	this	chapter	will	describe	important	elements	of	Zambia’s	political	system	since	the	1991	elections.	It	will	be	argued	that	Zambia’s	political	system	in	the	first	two	decades	of	multiparty	rule	was	essentially	that	of	a	dominant	party	system.	The	chapter	will	conclude	with	a	review	of	the	economic	liberalisation	of	the	1990s	–	its	economic	and	social	consequences	and	its	effect	on	the	influence	(or	lack	thereof)	of	traditional	interest	groups	on	economic	policy-making.				
A	brief	history	of	planning	in	Zambia			As	in	other	African	countries,	development	planning	in	Zambia	began	long	before	independence.108	Beginning	in	1945,	this	mostly	consisted	of	ten-year	agricultural	plans	designed	by	colonial	officials.	Some	of	the	policies	included:	the	introduction	of	cash	crops,	the	introduction	of	permanent	farming	systems,	and	apparent	attempts	at	forced	villagisation	in	the	late-1950s	and	early-1960s.		
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After	independence	in	1964,	Zambia’s	new	leaders	enthusiastically	adopted	development	planning.	For	the	new	government,	planning	was	a	means	to	ensure	that	newly	created	policies	resulted	in	tangible	development	outcomes	(see	Table	3	for	a	timeline	of	planning	since	independence).	A	National	Development	Committee	(NDC)	–	headed	by	the	vice	president	–	was	established	at	independence	in	the	cabinet	to	oversee	the	preparation	and	implementation	of	national	planning.109	A	Department	of	Development	Planning	within	the	Ministry	of	Finance	(MoF)	provided	technical	assistance	to	the	NDC.	In	1966,	an	Office	of	National	Development	Planning	was	established	in	the	Vice	President’s	office	to	integrate	programmes	from	the	ministries	and	provinces	and	make	submissions	to	the	NDC.			
Table	3:	A	timeline	of	planning	in	Zambia	1959		 Ministry	of	Finance	(MoF)	created		October	1964	 Independence	1964	 National	Development	Committee	(NDC)	situated	in	cabinet	1964	 MoF	houses	Department	of	Development	Planning		1965	 Transitional	National	Development	Plan	period	commences	1966	 Provincial	Development	Committees	(PDCs),	District	Development	Committees	(DDCs)	created	June	1966	 Transitional	NDP	period	ends	July	1966	 Office	of	National	Development	Planning	established	in	VP’s	office	July	1966	 First	NDP	period	begins		1970	 Development	planning	moved	back	to	MoF	December	1970	 First	NDP	period	ends	(although	projects	concluded	one	year	later)	January	1972	 Second	NDP	period	begins	1972	 Ministry	of	Development	Planning	and	National	Guidance	created	1974	 Ministry	eliminated.	Development	planning	placed	in	MoF	again	December	1975	 Separate	Ministry	of	Development	Planning	established		1976	 Second	NDP	period	ends	May	1977	 National	Commission	for	Development	Planning	(NCDP)	established	in	Prime	Minister’s	office	1979		 NCDP	moved	to	president	office		1980		 Local	Administration	Act	–	PDCs	and	DDCs	replaced	with	Provincial	Planning	Units	(PPU)	and	District	Planning	Units	(DPUs)	January	1980	 Third	NDP	period	begins	April	1983		 One-year	stand-by	agreement	signed	with	IMF.	Third	NDP	abandoned		July	1987		 Interim	NDP/NERP	period	begins	December	1988	 Interim	NDP/NERP	period	ends	
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January	1989	 Fourth	NDP	period	begins,	though	it	is	soon	to	be	abandoned	August	1989	 Policy	Framework	Paper	1989-1993	announced	February	1990	 Preliminary	agreement	signed	with	both	Bank	and	Fund	October	1991	 MMD	comes	to	power	1991	 Centralised	development	planning	ceases	1992	 NCDP	merged	with	Directorate	of	Public	Investment	Programmes	(PIP)	March	1993	 Public	Sector	Reform	Programme	launched		1994	 NCDP	dissolved		1995	 Provincial	Development	Coordinating	Committees	(PDCC)	and	District	Development	Coordinating	Committees	(DDCC)	replace	PPUs	and	DPUs	March	2000	 MoF	begins	preparation	of	Interim	Poverty	Reduction	Strategy	Paper	(I-PRSP)		June	2000	 I-PRSP	submitted	to	and	accepted	by	World	Bank	July	2000	 Draft	PRSP	process	begins	December	2001	 Mwanawasa	takes	offices	January	2002	 Development	planning	resumes.	MoF	becomes	Ministry	of	Finance	and	National	Planning	(MoFNP)	2002	 Department	of	Planning	and	Economic	Management	(DPEM)	established	within	MoFNP.	PPUs	re-established	April	2002	 Draft	PRSP	approved	by	cabinet	May	2002	 Draft	PRSP	approved	by	boards	of	Fund	and	Bank	October	2002	 TNDP	period	begins	December	2005	 TNDP	period	ends	December	2006	 Fifth	NDP	period	begins	2010	 Fifth	NDP	period	ends	
 The	Transitional,	First,	and	Second	National	Development	Plans	were	created	using	this	relatively	centralised	and	top-down	process.110	In	the	first	decade	after	independence,	the	economy	grew	at	an	average	of	2.3%	mainly	due	to	strong	copper	prices	on	the	international	market	and	subsequent	capital	investment.111	Government	used	the	revenue	to	finance	large	infrastructure	projects	in	the	health,	education,	transport,	housing,	and	energy	sectors.	Indeed,	while	the	first	NDP	1966-1970	did	provide	estimates	for	expected	recurrent	expenditure	over	the	plan	period,	its	overwhelming	focus	was	on	capital	investment.			The	first	NDP	was	essentially	a	detailed	list	of	the	numerous	investments	that	were	intended	to	be	carried	out	during	the	plan	period	and	were	expected	to	
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amount	to	£429	million	pounds.112	Of	this	total,	government	would	provide	£282	million	and	the	private	sector	would	be	expected	to	contribute	£147	million.113	Of	the	government’s	£282	million,	aid	would	contribute	£5	million;	external	loans	£58	million;	and	domestic	resources	£217	million.114		Despite	overall	growth	and	infrastructural	improvement,	plan	implementation	was	generally	weak,	as	planning	bodies	had	no	authority	over	the	ministries	who	would	in	theory	be	executing	the	plans.	Additionally,	the	planning	and	budgeting	processes	were	carried	out	separately;	with	the	result	that	the	national	budget	was	often	spent	on	projects	not	included	in	the	plans.115			In	response	to	the	weaknesses	in	the	planning	system,	an	independent	National	Commission	for	Development	Planning	(NCDP)	was	established	in	1977	under	the	deputy	secretary	of	the	cabinet	before	being	moved	to	the	president’s	office	in	1979.	Placing	the	NCDP	in	the	presidency	was	intended	to	strengthen	the	planning	process	and	it	subsequently	became	the	most	important	body	in	the	planning	structure.	It	was	responsible	for	the	preparation	and	implementation	of	plans.	Planning	under	the	NCDP	was	slightly	more	consultative	than	previously	(at	least,	within	government	itself).	The	president,	ministries,	provincial	councils,	cabinet,	and	UNIP’s	National	Council	were	all	involved.	The	attempt	to	improve	the	capacity	of	planning	bodies	in	the	late	1970s	was	nevertheless	not	met	with	an	improvement	in	efficacy	of	the	NDPs	themselves.	The	Second	NDP,	1972-1976,	coincided	with	the	beginning	of	the	global	recession	that	would	trigger	the	contraction	of	the	international	copper	market.	One	of	the	main	assumptions	of	the	Second	NDP	was	that	copper	prices	would	level	out	and	mining	income	would	see	a	slight	increase	over	the	period.116	None	of	the	Second	NDP’s	assumptions	would	hold	true	and	most	of	the	plan’s	major	objectives	were	therefore	not	met.117		The	Third	NDP,	1979-1983,	was	similarly	ineffectual	as	it	suffered	from	insufficient	finances.	Additionally,	there	was	a	shortage	of	civil	servants	with	the	requisite	capabilities	to	assist	with	the	plan’s	preparation	and	the	variety	of	activities	required	by	its	implementation.118	In	the	face	of	falling	mining	revenue,	government	spending	was	increasingly	financed	by	borrowing.	By	the	end	of	
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1982,	Zambia’s	total	external	debt	was	approximately	$4,5	billion.	119	In	1983,	debt-servicing	costs	were	estimated	at	$550	million,	equivalent	to	52%	of	export	earnings	at	the	time.120	In	April	1983,	Kaunda	agreed	to	a	one-year	stand-by	agreement	with	the	IMF.	In	that	same	month,	government	abandoned	the	third	development	plan	and	suspended	planning	activities.			Government’s	growing	engagement	with	the	BWIs	was	paralleled	by	increasing	domestic	opposition	to	IMF-mandated	structural	adjustment.	Widespread	rioting	in	December	1986	forced	Kaunda	to	reinstate	recently	removed	food	subsidies.	Within	Kaunda’s	own	administration,	there	was	strong	opposition	to	liberal	economic	reform.121	In	1986,	several	key	proponents	of	structural	adjustment	–including	the	finance	minister,	central	bank	governor,	and	presidential	economic	advisor	–	were	replaced	by	IMF	critics.122	In	July	1987,	the	Kaunda	government	reinstituted	planning	with	the	launch	of	an	interim	NDP,	known	as	the	New	Economic	Recovery	Programme	(NERP).	The	NERP	was	intended	to	lead	to	a	fully	formed	NDP	by	1989	and	can	be	summed	up	by	its	slogan:	“Growth	from	our	own	resources”.	Some	of	the	key	policy	changes	introduced	by	the	NERP	were	the	re-introduction	of	import	controls	and	a	10%	cap	on	debt	service	payments.	123	In	September	1987,	after	Zambia	refused	to	pay	debt-servicing	costs	at	the	required	rate,	the	IMF	declared	it	ineligible	for	future	support	and	ceased	disbursements.	Virtually	all	other	multilateral	lenders	and	bilateral	funders	followed	suit.124			Under	the	NERP,	the	economy	recorded	a	short-lived	spurt	of	6.2%	growth	in	1988.125	Despite	this,	the	funding	restrictions	soon	began	to	bite.	By	August	1989,	Kaunda’s	government	was	compelled	to	implement	liberal	economic	reforms	under	a	Policy	Framework	Paper.	By	1990,	Zambia	had	reached	a	preliminary	agreement	with	both	the	Fund	and	the	Bank.126	Years	of	economic	decline	had	created	a	critical	dependence	on	multilateral	and	bilateral	funding	that	government	proved	unable	to	break	–	multilaterals	had	provided	
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approximately	70%	of	Zambia’s	foreign	exchange	in	the	1980s.127	As	Fraser	notes:			
Within	eighteen	months	of	the	launch	of	the	NERP,	the	donor	freeze	had	
successfully	made	the	point	it	aimed	to:	Zambia	was	incapable	of	growing	
through	its	own	resources,	and	the	price	of	growing	with	donor	support	
would	be	compliance	with	donor	priorities	and	timelines	for	
implementation.128		By	1989	the	Kaunda	administration	once	again	suspended	development	planning	in	favour	of	structural	adjustment	and	macroeconomic	stabilisation.	Put	another	way,	SAPs	radically	changed	government’s	approach	to	planning.	SAPs	acknowledged	that	government	would	still	be	required	to	plan	for	the	future	but	planning	here	should	be	understood	in	the	most	limited	sense	of	the	word.	It	is	fundamentally	different	from	the	post-colonial	development	planning	described	earlier.	Planning	under	SAPs	was	not	intended	to	be	very	forward-looking	or	to	be	particularly	concerned	with	capital	expenditure.	Government’s	planning	activities	under	SAPs	would	be	similar	to	that	of	a	company’s	management	team	setting	the	firm’s	annual	budget.	Planning	in	the	era	of	structural	adjustment	was	therefore	primarily	focused	on	ensuring	that	expenditure	was	executed	with	appropriate	discipline.			This	is	made	clear	in	a	1987	World	Bank	Public	Expenditure	Review.	Under	the	heading	“Planning	and	budgeting”,	the	report	notes:		
The	government	has	initiated	a	new	system	of	annual	planning	to	guide	
budget	preparation	…	In	order	to	conserve	on	scarce	planning	personnel,	
NCDP	needs	to	use	the	annual	plan	as	the	primary	instrument	for	guiding	
public	expenditure	policy	and	deemphasize	five-year	and	provincial	
planning.129		To	put	it	another	way,	rather	than	being	concerned	with	the	long-term	structural	change	of	the	economy,	planning	in	the	late-1980s	and	early	1990s	had	two	short-term	goals:	minimise	the	budget	deficit	and	rationalise	current	expenditure.		
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The	Fund	and	Bank	would	again	suspend	their	agreements	with	Zambia	in	September	1991,	due	to	the	UNIP	government’s	failure	to	service	its	debt	since	July	of	that	year.			When	the	MMD	came	to	power	in	October	1991,	it	made	the	decision	to	abandon	centralised	development	planning	entirely	in	favour	of	wide-ranging	liberal	economic	reforms.130	Planning	was	associated	with	Kaunda’s	supposedly	statist	and	socialist	economic	policies.	In	line	with	World	Bank	recommendations,	planning	was	reduced	to	budgetary	control	and	expenditure	management.			In	1992,	the	NCDP	was	merged	with	the	Directorate	of	Public	Investment	Programmes	(PIPs)	in	the	MoF.	As	with	most	liberal	economic	reforms	adopted	by	the	new	government,	the	abandonment	of	central	planning	was	an	explicit	recommendation	of	the	BWIs.	The	World	Bank	issued	a	1992	Public	Expenditure	Review	based	on	a	mission	to	Zambia	between	September	and	October	1991	in	which	it	assisted	the	Ministry	of	Finance	with	the	preparation	of	the	1992	budget.131	The	draft	report	was	then	apparently	discussed	with	government	officials	in	April	1992	and	then	again	between	September	and	October	1992.	The	report	considered	it	vital	to	restructure	public	expenditure,	so	as	to	“restore	economic	stability	and	growth”.132	The	report’s	strategy	for	achieving	these	objectives	consisted	of	three	pillars:			1. Sharp	expenditure	reductions;	2. Significant	reallocations	to	support	priority	sectors	and	programmes;	3. Strengthening	management	of	public	expenditure	for	effective	implementation	of	the	allocative	decisions.133		The	report	commends	the	finance	ministry	on	its	efforts	to	improve	the	budget	process.	But	it	notes:		
There	is	a	lack	of	integration	of	budgeting	and	planning	not	only	at	a	
macro-level,	but	also	within	each	ministry.	The	ambiguity	surrounding	the	
role	of	the	other	main	policy	player	(i.e.	the	NCDP)	and	the	resulting	lack	of	
communication	between	this	agency	and	the	key	economic	ministries	has	
weakened	the	budget	process.134				The	Public	Expenditure	Review	therefore	came	to	the	following	conclusion:		
 
130 Mulungushi, "Policy development and implementation in the post-liberalization era in Zambia 
(1990s and beyond): towards a participatory planning and economic management model," 235. 
131 World Bank, "Zambia – Public expenditure review (Vol. 1): Main report (English)," (Washington, 
D.C.: World Bank, 1992). 
132 Ibid., i. 
133 Ibid.  
134 Ibid., 5. 
 31 
	
We	recommend	that	Government	end	the	current	ambiguity	surrounding	
the	role	of	the	NCDP	in	long-term	development	planning	and	its	relationship	
to	the	Ministry	of	Finance.	NCDP’s	function	should	be	shifted	from	its	
current	focus	on	ambitious	five-year	plans	to	strategic	planning	for	the	
public	investment	program,	long-term	policy	planning	in	areas	such	as	land	
and	manpower	development,	analyzing	and	reviewing	macro-economic	
policy	issues.135				The	NCDP	was	subsequently	abolished	in	1994,	along	with	provincial,	district,	and	sector-level	planning	units.			It	is	notable	that	development	planning	had	been	suspended	before	the	MMD	came	to	power.	However,	suspending	the	activities	of	the	NCDP	in	1983	and	then	again	in	1989	implied	that	Kaunda	possibly	believed	that	long-term	development	planning	could	be	returned	to	once	the	economic	crisis	had	been	resolved.	In	contrast,	the	MMD’s	decision	to	abandon	planning	–	and	later	to	dismantle	the	NCDP	–	represents	a	substantive	shift	in	Zambia’s	economic	policy-making	history.	It	speaks	to	the	MMD	government’s	adoption	of	the	Washington	Consensus	as	the	paradigm	within	which	economic	policy	decisions	were	made.	One	of	the	keys	tenets	of	this	paradigm	is	the	exhortation	to	‘roll	back	the	state’.136	The	MMD’s	abandonment	of	planning	once	in	power	speaks	to	the	intention	of	some	within	the	MMD	to	do	just	that	–	to	reduce	the	state	to	the	minimum	level	necessary	to	allow	for	the	unimpeded	operation	a	free	and	competitive	market.			
Economic	decline	and	the	rise	of	the	opposition	in	the	1980s		The	MMD	ended	Kenneth	Kaunda’s	27-year	rule	in	a	resounding	victory	in	the	October	1991	elections.	The	MMD	blamed	Kaunda’s	state-run	economy,	and	the	patronage	politics	it	engendered,	for	the	country’s	precipitous	economic	decline	since	independence.	At	independence	in	1964,	Zambia	was	the	world’s	third	largest	producer	of	copper	and	accounted	for	approximately	one-third	of	the	world’s	supply.137	It	was	one	of	the	most	industrialised	and	urbanised	countries	on	the	African	continent	at	the	time,	with	one	of	Sub-Saharan	Africa’s	highest	per	capita	incomes	and	an	economy	twice	the	size	of	South	Korea.138	After	the	price	of	copper	collapsed	in	the	mid-1970s,	the	economy	began	to	shrink	and	debt	
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began	to	rise.	The	economy	began	a	relentless	decline	that	led	the	World	Bank	to	declare	it	one	the	world’s	least	developed	countries	in	the	early	1990s.139		The	collapse	of	the	economy	in	the	mid-1970s	forced	Kaunda’s	UNIP	government	to	engage	with	the	BWIs	for	the	first	time.	Zambia’s	relationship	with	the	BWIs	began	in	1973,	one	year	after	Kaunda	had	outlawed	all	political	parties	beside	his	own.	The	government	made	use	of	a	standby	agreement	with	the	IMF	in	1973	and	then	again	in	1976.	By	1978,	Zambia	had	come	to	rely	on	the	IMF	for	its	foreign	exchange.140	During	this	time	(the	late-1970s)	the	BWIs	called	on	government	to	implement	liberal	economic	reforms	but	did	not	get	involved	in	policy-making.	The	1980s	marked	the	beginning	of	a	new	approach	to	BWI	lending,	marked	by	an	increase	in	both	lending	and	conditions.141	Since	then,	conditionality	would	come	to	play	an	integral	part	in	Zambian	politics.142	The	policy	conditions	were	the	usual	Washington	Consensus	fare:	end	currency	controls,	slash	public	spending,	cap	civil	service	wages,	remove	barriers	to	trade	and	investment,	and	eliminate	subsidies	and	price	controls.143		Adjustment	lending	effectively	dominated	Zambia’s	development	financing	during	the	1980s.	For	example,	adjustment	lending	constituted	80%	of	the	Bank’s	loans	to	the	country	by	the	mid-1980s.144		Moreover,	from	1985	onwards,	structural	adjustment	programme	financing	accounted	for	a	larger	proportion	of	disbursements	made	to	Zambia	than	to	any	other	Sub-Saharan	African	country.145	Government	signed	seven	stabilisation	agreements	between	1975	and	1986,	though	none	of	them	saw	completion.			Structural	adjustment	prompted	intense	domestic	opposition	spearheaded	by	the	Zambian	Congress	of	Trade	Unions	(ZCTU).146	The	ZCTU	was	created	in	1965	in	an	attempt	to	bring	unions	into	government	and	to	contain	the	potential	political	threat	that	they	posed	to	the	UNIP	administration.147	Contrary	to	Kaunda’s	intentions,	unions	were	able	to	use	the	structure	provided	by	the	ZCTU	to	maintain	their	independence	throughout	the	1960s	and	1970s.	A	series	of	conflicts	between	government	and	the	unions	in	the	early	1980s	would	confirm	ZCTU	as	the	most	significant	opposition	force	at	the	time.	ZCTU	chairman	
 
139 Saasa and Carlsson, Aid and poverty reduction in Zambia: mission unaccomplished, 24. 
140 Rakner, Political and economic liberalisation in Zambia 1991-2001. 
141 Gladstone G Bonnick, Zambia country assistance review: turning an economy around (Washington, 
DC: World Bank Publications, 1997). 
142 Lennart Wohlgemuth and Oliver Saasa, "Discussion Paper No. 83: Changing aid relations in 
Zambia," (Maastricht: ECDPM, 2008). 
143 Fraser, "Zambia: Back to the future? Managing Aid Dependency Project." 
144 Bonnick, Zambia country assistance review: turning an economy around. 
145 Rakner, van de Walle, and Mulaisho, "Aid and Reform: Zambia." 
146 Carolyn Baylies and Morris Szeftel, "The fall and rise of multi‐party politics in Zambia," Review of 
African Political Economy 19, no. 54 (1992). 
147 David MC Bartlett, "Civil society and democracy: A Zambian case study," Journal of Southern 
African Studies 26, no. 3 (2000). 
 33 
Frederick	Chiluba	and	secretary	general	Newstead	Zimba	were	expelled	from	UNIP’s	Central	Committee,	along	with	fifteen	other	union	leaders,	in	January	1981	for	their	involvement	in	protests	against	the	recently	implemented	Local	Administration	Act	of	1980.	Chiluba	and	Zimba	were	arrested	and	detained	shortly	thereafter	following	several	related	strikes	(all	labour	activity	had	effectively	been	outlawed	with	the	1971	Industrial	Relations	Act).			Further,	the	ZCTU	strongly	opposed	the	creation	of	the	state-owned	behemoth	Zambia	Copper	Consolidated	Mines	(ZCCM)	in	the	1980s,	which	they	saw	as	providing	UNIP	with	greater	access	to	mining	revenue.	The	Mineworkers	Union	of	Zambia	(MUZ)	in	particular	opposed	the	increased	involvement	of	the	state	in	mining	firms,	which	they	associated	with	declining	working	and	living	conditions.	The	MUZ	–	which	had	roughly	50	000	members	at	the	time	–	began	to	believe	that	removing	the	state	from	mining	was	the	only	way	to	cease	their	economic	hardships.148	Between	1975	and	1988,	official	employment	had	fallen	by	ten	percent	and	wages	declined	by	66%	over	the	same	period.149	Furthermore,	national	poverty	had	increased	from	35%	in	1985	to	55%	in	1987.150	Towards	the	middle	of	the	decade,	living	standards	had	declined	and	state	involvement	in	mining	had	increased	despite	significant	labour	activity.	This	gave	rise	to	the	belief	among	unions	that	their	economic	demands	could	only	be	addressed	by	political	change.151		In	addition	to	opposing	state	involvement	in	the	economy,	the	ZCTU	was	vocal	in	its	opposition	of	structural	adjustment.	152	In	the	early	1980s,	the	unions	demanded	compensatory	pay	for	inflation	caused	by	the	removal	of	price	controls	and	caps	placed	on	wages.	In	1985,	inflation	increased	dramatically	after	the	exchange	rate	was	liberalised	and	several	price	controls	were	removed.	Chiluba	condemned	the	IMF	for	pitting	government	against	its	people	and	the	ZCTU	called	for	a	wage	increase	to	be	fixed	against	the	US	dollar.153			Government’s	scrapping	of	the	subsidy	for	the	staple	‘breakfast’	mielie	meal	in	December	1986	caused	a	100%	price	increase	overnight.	The	resulting	panic	buying	led	to	widespread	shortages	and	eventually	to	looting	and	rioting.	Authorities’	attempts	to	control	the	unrest	resulted	in	fifteen	deaths.	Kaunda	was	quick	to	backtrack	and	soon	re-implemented	food	subsidies,	although	protests	
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would	continue	against	the	IMF	and	the	liberal	economic	policies	that	government	was	implementing.			When	government	removed	maize	meal	subsidies	in	June	1990,	the	subsequent	doubling	of	prices	led	to	widespread	riots	that	saw	twenty-seven	people	killed.154	Unlike	the	1986	riots,	where	the	IMF	was	blamed	for	the	increasing	food	prices,	the	public’s	anger	in	1990	was	directed	at	Kaunda’s	one-party	state	and	the	country’s	persistent	economic	decline.155	Later	that	same	month,	thousands	celebrated	in	the	streets	when	army	lieutenant,	Mwambe	Luchembe,	announced	on	government	radio	that	a	coup	had	taken	place.	UNIP	was	quick	to	dispel	the	rumours	and	Luchembe	was	arrested	shortly	after	the	announcement	(he	would	be	released	by	August	of	that	year).156			Meanwhile,	the	move	towards	multiparty	democracy	was	gaining	momentum	as	opposition	forces	began	to	collaborate.	A	conference	held	on	20	and	21	July	1990	at	a	Lusaka	hotel	saw	the	establishment	of	the	National	Interim	Committee	for	Multi-Party	Democracy	(NICMD).157	The	new	organisation	was	chaired	by	Arthur	Wina,	the	country’s	first	finance	minister,	and	Chiluba	sat	on	the	six-person	committee.	Kaunda	signed	the	Constitutional	Amendment	Act	in	December	1990	that	repealed	the	ban	on	opposition	parties.	Subsequently,	in	January	1991,	the	NICMD	registered	as	a	political	party	under	the	name	the	Movement	for	Multiparty	Democracy.			The	MMD’s	National	Convention,	held	between	February	and	March	1991,	saw	a	highly	contested	and	highly	controversial	leadership	battle	in	which	Wina	and	Chiluba	emerged	as	the	front-runners.	The	opposition	groups	that	came	together	to	form	the	MMD	constituted	four	main	factions:	businessmen	(of	which	Wina	was	the	chief	representative),	labour,	churches,	and	academics.	Of	these	factions,	business	and	labour	appear	to	have	been	the	most	powerful.	Private	businessmen	allegedly	funded	MMD	to	the	tune	of	roughly	$10	million.158	The	ZCTU	provided	a	national	administrative	structure	and	the	critical	popular	support	that	gave	the	MMD	legitimacy	as	a	political	party.			At	the	convention,	Chiluba	was	voted	president	with	683	out	of	1200	delegate	votes	and	Levy	Mwanawasa	was	voted	vice-president,	although	the	voting	was	not	without	controversy.159	Delegates	complained	of	irregular	practices	such	as	backroom	deals	and	block	voting.	The	party’s	National	Council	was	constituted	primarily	by	businessmen,	many	of	whom	were	former	UNIP	members	or	had	
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benefitted	from	UNIP’s	patronage.	In	fact,	at	least	36	MMD	candidates	for	parliament	in	the	1991	elections	–	including	20	former	MPs	and	12	cabinet	members	–	were	UNIP	defectors.160		Indeed,	as	Baylies	and	Szeftel	explain:			
What	most	significantly	distinguished	MMD	from	UNIP	electoral	candidates	
was	less	their	age,	education	and	experience in	high	office,	than	their	
disgruntlement	with	UNIP	and	its	policies;	personal	affront	may	have	been	
as	significant	as	ideological	bent.161		In	other	words,	much	like	UNIP	at	independence,	the	MMD	was	a	broad	coalition	of	individuals	and	organisations	with	nothing	in	common	apart	from	opposition	to	Kaunda’s	rule.	The	two	dominant	factions,	business	and	labour,	seemed	to	agree	that	the	best	means	of	erasing	Kaunda’s	effect	on	the	economy	was	the	re-introduction	of	structural	adjustment	backed	by	international	funding.	The	business	community	believed	that	their	business	interests	were	best	served	by	the	introduction	of	market	friendly	policies	and	the	reduction	of	state	involvement	in	their	operations.	ZCTU	was	not	overtly	committed	to	any	particular	ideology	per	se,	but	the	unions	had	actively	opposed	UNIP	since	the	early	1980s	and	it	seemed	to	follow	that	the	private	sector	would	be	a	better	employer	than	the	state	had	been.	In	September	1990,	the	ZCTU	declared	that	it	was	no	longer	opposed	in	principle	to	structural	adjustment.	And	in	May	1991	Chiluba	publicly	stated	his	support	for	adjustment	and	privatisation.162		At	a	November	1990	meeting	with	the	World	Bank,	Arthur	Wina	assured	officials	that	an	MMD	government	would	honour	Zambia’s	debts.	In	a	1991	interview,	he	argued	that	Chiluba’s	career	in	labour	uniquely	positioned	him	to	avoid	trade	union	opposition	as	the	party	implemented	structural	adjustment.163		The	BWIs	shared	the	MMD’s	view	that	Zambia’s	economic	collapse	lay	solely	at	the	feet	of	UNIP	–	there	was	increasing	tacit	approval	among	donor	countries	and	multilateral	institutions	of	the	growing	unrest	and	opposition	to	Kaunda’s	rule.164	The	lenders	were	certainly	unsympathetic	to	the	fact	that	stringent	conditionality	as	part	of	a	1991	structural	adjustment	programme	would	undermine	UNIP’s	support	ahead	of	the	elections.	A	request	by	Kaunda	to	temporarily	suspend	conditions	in	the	run-up	to	the	election	was	flatly	denied	by	
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the	BWIs.	Instead,	Kaunda	was	told	that	he	“should	divorce	the	economic	programme	from	politics”.165			The	MMD	won	the	October	1991	election	with	76%	of	the	vote,	acquiring	125	out	of	150	seats	in	parliament.166	Of	the	24	members	in	the	MMD’s	first	cabinet,	13	were	business	owners	or	businessmen	and	two	were	union	members.167	
 
From	a	one-party	to	a	dominant-party	system			The	1991	elections	were	hailed	internationally	as	a	peaceful	and	orderly	transition	from	one-party	rule	to	a	multi-party	political	system.	Nevertheless,	despite	the	apparent	opening	up	of	political	competition,	the	political	system	ushered	in	in	the	1990s	retained	several	of	the	legacies	of	its	predecessor.	One	of	the	key	features	here	is	the	dominance	accorded	to	the	ruling	party	and	the	almost	authoritarian	powers	available	to	the	president.168	As	Cheeseman	and	Hinfelaar	point	out,	this	is	the	reason	why	the	MMD	was	able	to	win	the	five	presidential	elections	between	1991	and	2008.169		The	political	system	introduced	with	multi-party	elections	can	be	described	as	a	dominant	party	system.170	During	UNIP’s	rule,	lines	between	the	state	and	the	ruling	part	were	increasingly	blurred.	In	addition,	Kaunda	was	able	to	centralise	power	in	the	presidency.	The	MMD	therefore	inherited	the	powers	of	incumbency	leading	Hinfelaar	and	Achberger	to	claim	in	2018	that	“Zambia	is	de	facto	still	characterised	by	imperial	or	executive	presidentialism”.171			Additionally,	parliament	is	institutionally	weak	with	little	oversight	over	government.	The	cabinet	is	appointed	by	the	president	–	and	is	thus	accountable	to	him	–	and	is	not	constitutionally	obliged	to	act	on	parliamentary	recommendations.	Although	annual	budgets	must	be	approved	by	parliament,	members	of	parliament	cannot	amend	ministry	allocations	or	the	budget	total	itself.	Moreover,	there	are	numerous	ways	in	which	cabinet	members	can	disperse	funds	without	parliament’s	prior	approval.	As	Rakner	and	Svasand	
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argue,	“this	makes	Zambia	more	of	a	presidential	system	than	a	president-parliamentary	or	semi-parliamentary	regime”.172		The	2001	national	elections	were	much	more	closely	contested	than	either	of	the	previous	two	and	marked	a	shift	to	a	more	competitive	political	system.173	The	MMD	retained	power	through	heavy-handed	election	interference,	leading	some	observers	to	claim	that	the	political	system	maintained	built-in	tendencies	to	a	dominant	party	system.174			During	its	twenty	years	in	office	between	1991	and	2011,	the	MMD	witnessed	major	internal	contests	for	control	of	the	party.	This	is	consistent	with	other	dominant	party	systems	where	transfers	of	power	tend	to	occur	within	parties,	rather	than	between	parties.175		Factionalism	and	fragmentation	have	been	persistent	themes	of	the	MMD’s	time	in	office.176	Paget	for	example	describes	four	periods	of	faction	formation	within	the	MMD	between	1991	and	2009:	
• 1991-1995	–	the	departure	or	expulsion	of	the	so-called	intellectuals	or	radicals,	such	as:	Akashambatwa	Mbikusita-Lewanika,	Mbita	Chitala,	and	Arthur	Wina;		
• 2000-2001	–	internal	conflict	caused	by	Chiluba’s	third-term	bid;	
• 2002-2003	–	power	struggle	between	Chiluba	as	the	president	of	the	MMD	and	Levy	Mwanawasa	as	the	newly	appointed	national	president;	
• 2008		 									–	contest	for	MMD	presidency	between	Rupiah	Banda	and	Peter	Magande	following	the	death	of	Mwanawasa.177			These	factions	formed	along	strategic	lines	to	contest	power	in	the	party.	The	contestations	usually	took	the	form	of	leadership	battles	for	the	presidency	of	the	party	and	ordinarily	occurred	either	in	the	run	up	to	the	party’s	convention	held	every	five	years	(where	the	party	president	is	chosen)	or	around	national	elections.	Despite	the	president’s	unrivalled	power	within	the	MMD,	there	was	considerable	power	distributed	amongst	individuals	and	institutions	(such	as	the	National	Executive	Committee)	within	the	party	by	virtue	of	its	organisational	structure.	As	a	result,	the	president’s	ability	to	exercise	his	authority	was,	to	some	extent,	dependent	on	certain	individuals	or	institutions	
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within	the	party.	The	president	is	central	to	any	coalition	but	is,	therefore,	also	requires	the	support	of	a	coalition	influential	party	members.			Ethnicity	and	regional	representation	do	affect	faction	formation.178	For	example,	the	MMD	had	strong	support	among	Bemba-speaking	communities	of	the	Copperbelt,	Northern,	and	Luapula	provinces.	Nevertheless,	ethnicity	is	often	not	the	determining	factor	of	coalitions.	Personal	relationships,	ideology,	and	strategic	considerations	also	play	important	roles	in	shaping	how	and	in	what	form	factions	are	created.	The	context	within	which	these	factions	are	formed	also	has	an	important	effect	on	the	nature	of	coalitions,	the	relationships	between	them,	and	the	outcomes	of	a	factional	contest.179	Contextual	factors	may	include	matters	of	principle	or	matters	of	contingency.	The	context	of	factional	battles	for	power	often	creates	“perverse	incentives”,	where	individuals	value	the	success	of	their	faction	over	success	of	their	party.180	This	may	result	in	situations	where	victory	for	one	faction	entails	the	weakening	of	the	party	as	a	whole.	As	will	be	shown	in	Chapter	Three,	this	was	the	case	in	the	leadership	contest	between	Chiluba	and	Mwanawasa	after	the	2001	elections.	Factions	are	not	stable	in	Zambian	politics	–	they	form	when	contestation	of	power	is	possible	and	break	up	if	they	lose	power.		The	structure	of	the	economy	has	important	implications	for	how	and	to	whom	state	resources	are	distributed.	Mkandawire	describes	Zambia’s	economy	as	that	of	a	“rentier	state”.181		A	rentier	state	is	one	that	depends	on	an	enclave	economy	with	a	strong	export	sector	that	has	few	productive	linkages	to	the	domestic	economy.	Production	is	usually	carried	out	by	international	firms	in	a	state-controlled	sector.	Mkandawire	classifies	a	rentier	state	as	one	where	at	least	thirty-five	percent	of	state	revenue	depends	on	the	export	of	one	commodity.	Over	the	FNDP	period,	2006-2010,	copper	contributed	an	annual	average	of	seventy-seven	percent	to	the	country’s	export	income.182			An	important	facet	of	an	African	rentier	state	is	that	the	owners	of	the	productive	sectors	of	the	enclave	economy	are	ordinarily	not	domestic.	Therefore,	negotiations	on	taxation	occur	between	the	state	and	multinational	firms.	The	amount	of	revenue	is	therefore,	according	to	Mkandawire,	“depoliticised”	and	is	largely	determined	by	the	state’s	negotiating	capability.183	The	dispersal	of	
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revenue	is,	however,	very	much	open	to	“political	contestation”.184	Political	interests	and	arrangements,	therefore,	can	affect	state	expenditure	in	important	ways.	One	of	the	ways	in	which	state	expenditure	is	mediated,	according	to	Mkandawire,	is	the	presence	or	absence	of	a	strong	society.		However,	economic	and	political	reforms	have	had	the	effect	of	substantially	weakening	traditional	non-state	interest	groups	in	Zambia	–	labour,	business,	and	farmers	–	while	simultaneously	affirming	the	dominant	political	position	of	government.185	This	will	be	expanded	upon	in	the	following	section.		
Economic	liberalisation	in	the	1990s		Development	planning	was	a	victim	of	the	rapid	and	widespread	economic	reforms	implemented	by	the	MMD	in	the	early-1990s.	As	a	party,	the	MMD	laid	out	its	economic	policies	in	its	1990	manifesto,	which	promised	that	a	MMD	government	would	restrict	itself	to	rehabilitating	and	rebuilding	economic	infrastructure	“with	a	small	public	sector	in	the	midst	of	a	basically	private	enterprise	economy”.186	Once	in	government	it	issued	the	Economic	and	Financial	Policy	Framework	1992-1994.	Some	of	the	policies	mentioned	in	the	Framework	include:	a	commitment	to	monetary	and	fiscal	stabilisation,	the	removal	of	price	controls	and	subsidies,	exchange	and	interest	rate	liberalisation,	the	removal	or	reduction	of	both	tariffs	and	non-tariff	trade	barriers,	civil	service	cuts,	and	the	privatisation	of	state-owned	entities.187			Finance	Minister	Emmanuel	Kasonde’s	first	budget	speech	in	1992	is	illustrative	of	this	reform	commitment	and	is	worth	quoting	at	some	length:		
…	[T]he	primary	objective	of	macroeconomic	policy	in	1992	is	to	begin	the	
process	of	turning	around	the	protracted	decline	of	the	economy	into	
sustained	positive	real	growth,	coupled	with	lower	inflation	and	consequent	
improvement	in	living	standards	and	the	quality	life	of	our	people.	This	will	
entail,	among	other	things,	continuing	to	liberalise	and	stabilise	the	
economy	so	as	to	enhance	economic	efficiency.		
	
To	achieve	this	we	need	to	steadfastly	continue	with	economic	policy	
reforms.	There	is	also	the	need	to	implement	such	reforms	more	diligently	
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and	in	a	more	timely	and	consistent	fashion	than	has	been	the	case	under	
the	last	government.188		In	the	same	speech,	the	finance	minister	reaffirmed	the	MMD’s	commitment	to	reducing	the	size	of	government	by	halting	recruitment,	cracking	down	on	wasteful	spending,	and	dismissing	civil	servants	faced	with	disciplinary	charges.189			The	multilateral	and	bilateral	agencies	were	enthusiastic	about	Zambia’s	new	reform-minded	government.	Due	to	its	democratic	transition	and	unequivocal	support	of	structural	adjustment,	the	MMD	government	enjoyed	extraordinary	levels	of	international	support	in	the	wake	of	the	1991	election.	Aid	began	to	flow	into	the	country	again	and	significant	debt	write-offs	followed.	Overseas	Development	Assistance	(ODA)	reached	its	peak	in	1992	when	Zambia	received	almost	$1.5	billion.190			Also	in	1992,	Zambia	agreed	to	a	Rights	Accumulation	Programme	(RAP)	with	the	IMF.	The	RAP	allows	willing	governments	with	significant	arrears	to	accrue	Special	Drawing	Rights	(SDR)	through	the	completion	of	an	IMF-mandated	reform	process.	The	country	would	then	be	able	to	access	financing	on	completion	of	the	process.	The	RAP	also	suspended	repayments	for	three	years	of	the	$1	billion	in	arrears	that	Zambia	owed	the	IMF.191			In	December	1991,	one	month	after	taking	office,	president	Chiluba	held	a	meeting	at	State	House	for	the	country’s	most	significant	donors.	He	used	the	meeting	to	reaffirm	his	intention	to	adhere	to	the	economic	policy	conditions	stipulated	by	the	BWIs.	He	assured	donors	at	the	meeting	that	he	intended	to	re-establish	the	county’s	creditworthiness.192	Chiluba	also	made	numerous	public	speeches	about	the	importance	of	multilateral	and	bilateral	funding	to	the	growth	of	the	economy.	Given	the	state	of	the	economy	and	government’s	significant	arrears,	multilateral	and	bilateral	financing	was	the	only	source	of	foreign	exchange	available	to	Chiluba’s	new	administration.	It’s	worth	noting	that	most	of	the	economic	policies	implemented	in	the	first	two	years	of	the	MMD’s	rule	were	the	policy	conditions	of	the	1992	IMF	agreement.	As	Rakner	et	al.	note:	“the	singular	focus	on	meeting	the	conditionality	benchmarks	made	the	Zambian	government	a	receiver	of	policy	rather	than	an	initiator”	[italics	in	original].193	
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	Indeed,	Mkandawire	would	refer	to	Zambia	–	at	least	between	1991	and	1993	–	as	a	“choiceless	democracy”,	a	developing	country	whose	policy	choices	were	limited	by	conditionality,	the	strength	and	prevalence	of	neoliberal	ideology,	and	the	presence	of	economic	constraints	(such	as	high	debt	and	limited	foreign	reserves).194			In	a	1996	interview	with	Lise	Rakner,	finance	minister	Emmanuel	Kasonde		(1991-1993)	indicated	that	government	fully	intended	to	take	advantage	of	its	post-election	“honeymoon	period”	to	implement	unpopular	but	supposedly	necessary	reforms.195	Government	scrapped	the	subsidy	for	staple	food	mealie-meal	in	December	1991,	resulting	in	a	700%	price	increase	by	October	1992.196	By	the	end	of	1992,	the	exchange	rate	had	been	fully	liberalised	and	in	1993	the	country’s	financial	markets	had	been	opened	to	overseas	banks,	investors,	and	insurance	companies.	By	1994,	Zambia’s	foreign	exchange	regulations	were	among	the	most	liberal	in	Sub-Saharan	Africa.197	The	new	government	began	removing	numerous	tariff	and	non-tariff	barriers	to	trade,	leading	to	an	influx	of	consumer	goods	over	its	first	five	years	in	office.		In	addition	to	fiscal	and	trade	reform,	privatisation	was	one	of	key	tenets	of	the	new	government’s	economic	policy.	The	Privatisation	Act	of	July	1992	created	the	Zambian	Privatisation	Authority,	the	organisation	responsible	for	divesting	the	country’s	parastatals.	Zambia’s	rapid	and	extensive	privatisation	process	was	described	by	the	World	Bank	as	“the	most	successful”	such	programme	on	the	continent.198	In	1995,	government	announced	that	it	would	liquidate	ZIMCO	(the	large	holding	company	where	all	parastatals	were	housed).	By	March	2000,	government	had	divested	113	out	of	a	portfolio	of	144	state-owned	enterprises.199			In	the	early	years	of	the	privatisation	programme	the	majority	of	the	parastatals	that	were	sold	off	were	small	or	medium	firms	such	as	hotels,	stores,	and	manufacturing	firms.	The	privatisation	of	the	larger	and	more	strategic	service	firms	(such	as	the	power	and	water	utilities)	and	ZCCM	was	much	slower.	ZCCM	would	only	be	sold	off	in	early	2000	after	a	lengthy	and	controversial	process	in	which	international	pressure	appeared	to	force	the	MMD	to	accept	an	offer	that	
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many	Zambians	considered	to	be	unfair.200	Further,	the	process	was	marred	by	widespread	allegations	of	corruption	–	MMD	ministers	were	accused	of	using	the	programme	as	a	means	to	access	state	assets.201		Zambia	completed	the	RAP	in	1995	due	predominantly	to	the	rapid	implementation	of	fiscal	and	monetary	reforms	in	late-1991	and	1992.202	The	IMF	therefore	approved	a	loan	worth	SDR	830	million,	the	majority	of	which	was	dispersed	through	the	Fund’s	three-year	Enhanced	Structural	Adjustment	Facility	(ESAF).203	The	multilaterals	viewed	the	completion	of	the	RAP	as	a	milestone	indicating	the	Chiluba	administration’s	commitment	to	economic	reform,	as	it	was	the	first	adjustment	programme	that	Zambia	had	completed.		Despite	this	apparent	achievement,	Chiluba’s	first	administration	garnered	significant	criticism,	both	internally	and	externally,	for	several	reasons.	Within	the	first	two	years	of	the	Chiluba’s	rule,	factionalism	and	in-fighting	had	increased	dramatically.204	Kasonde	was	unexpectedly	fired	in	April	1993.	He	was	in	Paris	at	the	time,	negotiating	with	donors.	Also	fired	were	Humphrey	Mulemba	(Minister	of	Mines	and	Mineral	Development),	Guy	Scott	(Minister	of	Agriculture,	Food,	and	Fisheries),	and	Arthur	Wina.	Mulemba	and	Wina	had	been	Chiluba’s	two	main	rivals	at	the	MMD’s	National	Convention	at	the	beginning	of	1991.	The	four	former	ministers	were	seen	as	some	of	the	key	reform	proponents	and	their	firing	suggested	that	Chiluba	might	have	been	moving	away	from	the	democratic	principles	that	the	MMD	had	initially	committed	to.			Ronald	Penza	replaced	Kasonde	and	would	be	finance	minister	from	1993	to	1998.	Penza	was	a	firm	believer	in	structural	adjustment	and	under	his	rule	the	Ministry	of	Finance	was	the	key	player	in	driving	liberal	economic	reform,	although	support	for	structural	adjustment	was	starting	to	wane	outside	of	the	presidency	and	the	MoF.		Labour,	in	particular,	was	becoming	increasingly	disaffected	with	the	rapid	and	thorough	economic	liberal	reforms.	Cuts	to	the	civil	service	led	to	the	loss	of	approximately	11	000	jobs	in	1992.205	In	total,	a	shrinking	public	sector	resulted	in	the	loss	of	60	000	jobs	between	1991	and	1995.206	GDP	contracted	by	2.8%	in	
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1992.	This	was	in	part	due	to	a	drought	that	decimated	the	agricultural	sector,	but	also	to	a	significant	debt	burden,	worsening	terms	of	trade,	and	increasing	inflation.207	By	the	middle	of	1993,	inflation	was	above	180%.208	Deteriorating	living	conditions,	increasing	inflation,	and	a	freeze	on	salary	increases	led	to	a	large	public	sector	strike	in	the	Copperbelt	in	early	1993.	In	June	of	that	year,	a	teachers’	strike	in	Kitwe	soon	spread	to	almost	all	government	departments	across	the	country.		Nevertheless,	labour’s	ability	to	influence	government	diminished	radically	in	the	1990s.	The	creation	of	the	MMD	had	subsumed	the	ZCTU’s	leadership,	its	organisational	structures,	and	to	some	extent	its	members.	Additionally,	liberalisation	and	privatisation	strategies	of	the	1990s	had	resulted	in	an	increase	in	unemployment	and	a	resulting	decrease	in	ZCTU	membership.	This	weakened	ZCTU	politically	and	financially	(as	a	result	of	a	reduction	in	membership	dues).		On	the	whole,	liberalisation	was	not	beneficial	for	local	businesses	either.	While	some	businesses	welcomed	deregulation,	others	were	unable	to	compete	in	an	open	economy.	In	addition,	obstacles	such	as	a	lack	of	access	to	finance	and	the	high	cost	of	fuel	and	electricity	weakened	many	small-to-medium-businesses	and,	by	extension,	weakened	business	associations.209	The	result	of	liberalisation	was	the	creation	a	business	environment	that	was	not	conducive	to	private	sector	development,	which	consequently	accounted	for	less	than	one-fifth	of	formal	sector	employment.210		Accordingly,	as	Rakner	observes,	business	“constituted	neither	an	electoral	threat	nor	a	useful	political	ally	for	the	MMD”.211		Nor	were	economic	reforms	beneficial	for	Zambia’s	agriculture	industry.	Agricultural	liberalisation	implemented	concurrently	with	macroeconomic	stabilisation	created	an	extremely	tough	economic	environment	for	producers	in	the	1990s.212	Some	of	the	key	reforms	in	the	agricultural	sector	included	the	removal	of	fertilizer	subsidies	for	small-scale	farmers,	the	removal	of	producer	price	controls,	and	the	privatisation	of	agricultural	marketing.	As	a	result,	rural	and	small-scale	producers	were	hardest	hit	by	the	agricultural	reforms.	
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Commercial	farmers,	who	initially	supported	liberalisation,	began	to	show	mixed	reactions	to	liberalisation	after	interest	rates	began	to	rise	in	1993.213		Nevertheless,	the	main	commercial	farmers	union	had	only	350	members	and	was	therefore	not	taken	seriously	by	government.214		By	the	end	of	the	1990s,	the	Chiluba	administration	had	managed	to	sideline	all	main	interest	groups	and	opposition	groups.	This	further	entrenched	the	president’s	unrivalled	influence	in	economic-policymaking.		
Conclusion 	The	abolition	of	national	development	planning	was	a	watershed	moment	in	Zambia’s	history.	It	represented	a	decisive	break	from	the	developmental	state	that	Kaunda	had	overseen	during	the	First	and	most	of	the	Second	Republic.	In	its	place,	the	Chiluba	administration	implemented	a	radically	different	state	–	one	where	fiscal	prudence	and	conservative	macroeconomic	management	replaced	developmentalism	as	the	guiding	principles	of	government	policy-making.	In	other	words,	the	MMD	oversaw	a	transition	from	the	post-independence	developmental	state	to	the	regulatory	state	of	the	Washington	Consensus	era.		Mkandawire	has	argued	that	many	African	states	could	be	described	as	developmental	–	in	a	similar	vein	to	East	Asian	economies	–	in	the	years	following	independence	and	preceding	structural	adjustment.215	Many	of	these	countries	saw	sustained	and	significant	growth	during	this	period.216	The	definition	of	a	developmental	state	is	somewhat	contested.217	But	a	basic	definition	can	be	found	using	two	concepts:	one	ideological	and	the	other	structural.218	In	terms	of	the	former,	the	state	would	ascribe	to	a	type	of	‘developmentalist’	ideology	that	sees	the	state	as	the	steward	of	development	in	the	country.	In	this	sense,	leaders	attempt	to	establish	an	“ideological	hegemony”219	whereby	governments	“encourage	citizens	to	think	of	the	state	as	the	prime	mover	raising	the	standard	of	living”.220			
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The	structural	component	of	a	developmental	state	refers	to	its	capacity	to	create	and	effectively	implement	policies.	Centeno,	Kohli,	and	Yashar	define	state	capacity	as	the	“bureaucratic,	managerial,	and	organizational	ability	to	process	information,	implement	policies,	and	maintain	governing	systems”.221	The	authors	note	that	this	relatively	technocratic	definition	cannot	be	separated	from	the	historical	forces	that	shape	state	capacity	or	the	political	landscape	in	which	it	is	deployed.	In	short,	a	developmental	state	can	be	described	as	one	with	both	the	will	and	the	capacity	to	drive	development.	Post-independence	Zambia	–	with	its	large	investments	in	infrastructure,	social	services,	state-owned	companies,	and	civil	servants	–	does	appear	to	fit	this	description.			However,	as	Mkandawire	notes,	it	is	possible	for	a	state	to	fail	to	deliver	on	its	development	promises	–	despite	having	both	the	will	and	the	capacity	–	for	a	variety	of	reasons,	including	exogenous	economic	shocks.	This	raises	the	possibility	of	a	‘failed	developmental	state’.222	In	a	sense,	Zambia	in	the	late-1970s	and	early-to-mid-1980s	can	be	seen	as	a	failed	developmental	state.			The	Kaunda	administration	responded	to	the	declining	terms	of	trade	with	politically	expedient	solutions	that	led	to	crippling	levels	of	debt,	several	current	account	crises,	and	shrinking	foreign	reserves.	By	the	end	of	Kaunda’s	reign,	the	economy	had	been	contracting	consistently	for	at	least	fifteen	years.223	In	addition,	approximately	70-to-80%	of	Zambians	were	considered	to	be	living	below	the	poverty	line	in	the	1990s.224			In	this	sense,	the	decision	to	abandon	planning	–	and	to	roll	back	the	state	more	generally	–	by	the	newly	elected	MMD	could	be	described	as	a	practical	attempt	to	turn	around	a	devastated	economy.	Ubiquitous	corruption	and	inept	financial	management	had	compounded	the	effects	of	the	commodities	markets’	collapse	that	began	in	the	mid-1970s.	The	new	MMD	government	simply	didn’t	have	the	resources	for	any	long-term	public	investment.	Moreover,	reining	in	debt,	improving	budgetary	management,	and	restoring	stability	to	the	economy	were	prerequisites	for	the	beginning	of	an	economic	recovery.	That	society	would	have	to	bear	some	of	the	costs	of	adjustment	was,	most	likely,	unavoidable.				Nevertheless,	the	Chiluba	administration’s	economic	policies	upon	entering	office	were	not	those	of	a	government	trying	to	restore	some	semblance	of	
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normality	to	the	economy	with	the	hope	of	one	day	being	able	to	continue	public	investment	without	compromising	the	county’s	fiscal	position.	Rather	it	seems	that,	as	Rakner,	van	der	Walle,	and	Mulaisho	observe,	“both	the	government	and	the	external	donors	ha[d]	made	fiscal	austerity	an	end	in	itself	and	a	measure	of	reform	commitment”.225			The	effective	dismantling	of	the	NCDP	in	1994	was	presented	in	this	chapter	as	a	by-product	or	consequence	of	the	unmitigated	liberalisation	agenda	pursued	by	several	key	decision-makers	–	the	president,	ministers	of	finance,	and	a	select	number	of	advisors	to	the	president	–	in	the	years	immediately	following	the	first	multiparty	elections.	A	body	that	oversaw	long-term	planning	was	a	useless	appendage	in	a	regulatory	state	that	believed	that	the	market	should,	and	would,	be	the	key	driver	of	development.	Though	it	was	unlikely	to	have	been	an	explicit	condition	of	the	agreements	signed	with	the	BWIs,	the	multilaterals	had	on	several	occasions	in	the	late-1980s	suggested	that	planning	capacity	should	be	redirected	from	creating	vague	long-term	to	plans	to	improving	short-term	budgetary	management.	In	this	sense,	abandoning	planning	was	most	likely	a	“soft	condition”	of	the	agreements	signed	between	the	Chiluba	administration	and	the	IMF	and	World	Bank.226			Conditionality	refers	to	the	policy	conditions	to	which	recipient	countries	must	adhere	if	they	are	to	receive	financing	from	the	BWIs.227	There	are	a	variety	of	condition	types,	some	of	which	are	given	more	weight	than	others.	These	can	be	described	on	a	spectrum	from	formal	‘hard’	conditions	to	more	informal	‘soft’	conditions.228	Soft	conditions	are	general	undertakings,	broadly	committed	to	by	a	recipient	government	in	its	letter	of	intent	(essentially	a	memorandum	of	understanding)	to	the	BWIs	on	signing	a	financing	agreement.	On	the	other	hand,	hard	conditions	refer	to	explicit	targets	that	a	government	must	meet	to	ensure	that	the	BWIs	continue	to	disperse	funding.	These	hard	conditions	include	‘prior	actions’	such	as	the	implementation	of	a	PRSP	for	the	period	of	a	year	and	‘performance	criteria’	such	as	maintaining	inflation	within	a	certain	range.	The	1980s	saw	a	proliferation	in	the	number	of	policy	conditions	and	an	increase	in	the	number	of	policy	areas	to	which	they	applied.229			The	mechanism	by	which	conditionality	was	expected	to	work	was	the	financial	leverage	that	the	international	lenders	held	over	recipient	government.	This	leverage	was	significant,	but	did	not	derive	from	the	size	of	loan.	BWI	financing	actually	made	up	a	relatively	small	percentage	of	aid	inflows	to	Africa	in	the	
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1980s	and	1990s.230	Rather,	the	leverage	derives	largely	from	the	timing	of	the	loans.	The	BWIs	lend	when	no	other	institutions	are	willing	to,	when	countries	are	suffering	under	balance	of	payments	crises,	massive	debt	overhangs,	and	dangerously	low	levels	of	foreign	reserves.	The	argument	here	is	that	the	dire	economic	reality	facing	many	African	countries	in	the	1980s	and	1990s	limited	the	options	that	were	realistically	open	to	decision-makers	in	those	countries.	Chazan	and	Rothchild	therefore	argue	that:			
With	only	a	limited	ability	to	extract	resources	from	domestic	sources	and	
with	state	treasuries	near	empty,	leaders	found	themselves	‘hemmed-in’	
with	little	recourse	but	to	seek	foreign	assistance.231		Nevertheless,	the	financial	leverage	of	the	BWIs	should	not	be	overstated.	As	Gordon	argues,	“[f]inancial	leverage,	while	the	most	visible	element	within	conditionality,	is	part	of	a	broader	pattern	of	donor	influence	on	economic	reform	in	Africa”.232	Arguably,	more	important	is	the	intellectual	and	political	influence	wielded	by	multilateral	and	bilateral	agencies.			Writing	in	1993,	Gordon	argues	that	the	“IFIs	[International	Financial	Institutions]	have	been	the	main	conduit	of	the	diffusion	of	the	ideas	of	economic	liberalism	in	Africa”.233	While	this	may	be	something	of	a	simplification,	the	multilateral	institutions	do	seem	to	have	had	an	outsized	influence	in	the	policy	arenas	of	developing	countries,	particularly	in	relation	to	more	technical	areas	that	would	fall	under	the	ambit	of	ministries	of	finance.234			One	way	of	conceptualising	this	intellectual	influence	is	to	picture	the	BWIs	at	the	centre	of	a	transnational	epistemic	community.	According	to	Haas:		
An	epistemic	community	is	a	network	of	professionals	with	recognized	
expertise	and	competence	in	a	particular	domain	and	an	authoritative	
claim	to	policy-relevant	knowledge	within	that	domain	or	issue-area.235		
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These	communities	are	defined	by	shared	norms	and	causal	beliefs	that	shape	the	type	of	policy	problems	tackled	and	solutions	given.	This	BWI-led	epistemic	community	is	transnational	and	includes	BWI	economists,	technical	advisers	to	recipient	governments	(usually	employed	by	bilateral	agencies),	and	technocrats	in	the	relevant	ministries	in	recipient	countries.			The	actors	within	the	community	formally	engage	with	each	other	in	at	least	three	separate	ways.236		The	first	is	through	policy	dialogue	between	recipient	governments	and	the	BWIs;	the	second	is	training	–	provided	by	international	and	bilateral	agencies	–	for	local	technocrats;	and	the	third	is	technical	assistance	for	recipient	governments	funded	by	the	international	creditors	and	aid	agencies		Despite	describing	themselves	as	‘apolitical’,	the	actions	of	the	BWIs	are	inseparable	from	the	political	context	in	which	they	operate	at	both	an	international	and	domestic	level.237	In	particular	interest	to	this	chapter	are	the	domestic	political	factors	that	may	influence	the	adoption	of,	and	commitment	to,	a	policy	idea	or	reform	measure	by	a	recipient	government	engaged	in	negotiations	with	the	BWIs.			Realising	that	‘politics’	could	hinder	effective	reform	implementation,	the	BWIs	sought	to	isolate	the	technical	process	of	policy	reforms	from	potentially	damaging	‘political’	elements.	Unlike	most	international	agreements,	the	executive	unanimously	approves	BWI	programmes	without	needing	the	approval	of	formal	political	institutions,	such	as	parliament.	The	multilaterals	sought	out	local	champions	in	the	form	of	decision-makers	who	might	be	able	to	push	through	reforms	despite	‘political’	opposition.	They	sought	out	“credible	technocrats”	who	were	respected	internationally	and	well	placed	to	influence	decision-making	in	the	executive.238	These	“sympathetic	and	willing	interlocutors”	thus	gained	political	prominence	vis-à-vis	their	position	to	government	and	to	the	multilaterals.239	This	is	especially	true	since,	at	the	time,	negotiations	were	conducted	in	secret	between	the	international	lenders	and	recipient	governments.	This	meant	that	the	selected	technocrats	were	often	the	only	government	officials	with	full	access	to,	and	understanding	of,	important	information	coming	from	the	negotiations.	In	summary,	the	BWIs	sought	to	alter	the	local	domestic	political	landscape	to	empower	their	favoured	technocrats.	To	the	extent	that	these	technocrats	are	able	to	affect	decision-making,	the	BWIs	can	
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be	said	to	wield	significant	influence	in	the	domestic	politics	and	policy	arenas	of	recipient	countries.				This	influence	is	significant,	but	not	necessarily	a	determining	factor	in	the	outcomes	of	negotiations	between	BWIs	and	recipient	countries.	For	example,	Finance	Ministers	Kasonde	(1991-1993)	and	Penza	(1993-1998)	do	seem	to	have	acted	as	‘sympathetic	and	willing	interlocutors’	in	negotiations	with	the	international	creditors.	However,	they	were	only	able	to	push	a	radically	liberal	economic	agenda	because	they	had	the	support	of	the	president.	And	as	was	increasingly	evident	after	1993,	Chiluba	had	several	options	open	to	him	to	stall	reforms	if	he	felt	that	the	BWIs	were	overreaching	themselves.			In	conclusion,	the	BWIs’	played	a	seminal	role	in	the	abandonment	of	planning	in	Zambia	in	the	early-1990s.	Their	financial,	intellectual,	and	political	influence	all	came	to	bear	on	the	government’s	decision	to	abandon	planning.	Arguably,	this	influence	reached	its	peak	in	in	the	early-1990s	when	the	interests	of	the	BWIs	and	those	of	key	decision-makers	within	government	were	closely	aligned.			 	
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Chapter	Three:	The	Reintroduction	of	Planning		
Introduction			President	Levy	Mwanawasa	made	his	first	parliamentary	address	as	head	of	state	on	22	January	2002,	during	which	he	announced	that	national	development	planning	would	be	reinstated.	In	September	of	that	year,	Zambia’s	Poverty	Reduction	Strategy	Paper	(PRSP)	–	launched	in	July	–	was	effectively	renamed	the	Transitional	National	Development	Plan	(TNDP).	The	Fifth	National	Development	Plan	(FNDP)	2006-2010	was	subsequently	released	in	December	2006.	The	Fourth	National	Development	Plan	–	or	the	New	Economic	Recovery	Programme	(NERP)	–	was	launched	in	1987	before	being	suspended	in	1989,	making	it	the	last	development	plan	to	be	issued	before	planning	was	jettisoned	by	the	MMD	government	in	the	early-1990s.			The	PRSP,	referred	to	by	some	as	‘quasi-planning’240,	can	be	seen	as	a	precursor	to	the	reintroduction	of	planning	in	Zambia	and	Heavily	Indebted	Poor	Countries	(HIPC)	countries	more	broadly.	As	Chimhowu	et	al.	observe,	fifty-two	of	sixty-three	countries	that	implemented	PRSPs	have	since	gone	on	to	implement	national	development	plans	as	well.	Certainly,	the	PRSP	influenced	Zambia’s	new	development	planning	in	important	ways.	When	Zambia	discarded	development	planning	in	the	early-1990s,	it	dismantled	all	its	planning	capacity.	The	PRSP	provided	much	of	the	structures	and	processes	that	government	could	use	to	fill	this	gap	when	it	was	designing	the	FNDP.			Nevertheless,	the	FNDP	was	intended	to	be	distinct	from	the	PRSP.	The	PRSP	was	essentially	a	continuation	of	structural	adjustment	with	increased	spending	to	ease	the	costs	of	adjustment	borne	by	the	most	vulnerable	in	society.	The	FNDP,	on	the	other	hand,	was	supposedly	more	comprehensive	in	scope	than	the	PRSP	and	covered	a	longer	period	(five	years	compared	to	two	years).	It	delineated	spending	priorities	and	general	resource	allocation	for	the	five-year	period.	The	FNDP	was	intended	to	stipulate	the	recurrent	and	capital	expenditure	that	would	transform	the	economy	along	the	lines	laid	out	in	the	National	Long-Term	Vision	(Vision	2030).	As	will	be	explored	in	more	detail	below,	the	extent	to	which	the	FNDP	actually	differed	from	the	PRSP	is	somewhat	contentious.			This	chapter	will	begin	with	a	description	of	the	PRSP	under	the	HIPC	Initiative.	The	second	section	will	unpack	the	FNDP	in	more	detail	–	the	process	by	which	it	was	created,	the	planning	structure	of	which	it	formed	part,	and	the	plan	itself.	The	final	section	will	propose	two	main	explanations	for	the	reinstatement	of	
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development	planning	in	Zambia	–	one	external	and	the	other	internal.	With	respect	to	the	former,	it	will	be	argued	that	the	reintroduction	of	planning	should	be	seen	within	the	context	of	significant	changes	occurring	in	the	international	development	industry	at	the	time	in	which	multilateral	and	bilateral	agencies	attempted	to	harmonise	the	distribution	of	Overseas	Development	Assistance	(ODA)	to	recipient	countries.	In	this	sense,	national	development	strategies	were	seen	as	a	crucial	means	of	increasing	the	efficiency	and	effectiveness	of	ODA	inflows	to	emerging	countries.	In	terms	of	the	internal	explanation,	it	will	be	argued	that	the	interplay	of	political	interests	and	economic	ideas	played	a	pivotal	role	in	the	reintroduction	of	planning.			
PRSP	–	Laying	the	foundation	for	planning			As	mentioned	in	Chapter	One,	several	changes	were	made	to	the	HIPC	Initiative	before	its	re-launch	as	the	Enhanced	HIPC	Initiative	(HIPC	II)	in	December	1999.	One	of	the	most	important	changes	–	for	the	purposes	of	this	paper	at	least	–	was	that	debt	relief	would	be	conditional	on	the	completion	of	a	PRSP,	amongst	other	conditionalities.	The	conditions	of	debt	relief	enabled	the	BWIs	to	dictate,	not	only	the	policies	to	be	included	in	the	PRSPs,	but	also	the	process	by	which	they	were	made.			In	1999,	Zambia’s	external	public	debt	was	estimated	to	be	around	$5.2	billion,	which	amounted	to	roughly	160%	of	GDP	at	the	time.241	The	BWIs	claimed	that	Zambia	would	receive	a	total	reduction	of	$2.5	billion	of	external	debt	relief	after	it	had	completed	the	reforms	required	by	the	HIPC	II	programme.242			Government’s	borrowing	at	this	time	was	financed	mainly	by	the	international	agencies,	as	no	commercial	fund	was	willing	to	lend	to	such	a	distressed	economy.243	External	debt	was	split	between	the	multilaterals	(53%)	and	the	bilateral	agencies	(46%).244	The	burden	of	debt	relief	would	follow	this	same	proportion,	with	the	BWIs	providing	$1.3	billion	and	the	donors	accounting	for	$1.1	billion.245	Commercial	creditors	were	expected	to	contribute	$23	million	in	debt	forgiveness,	less	than	one	percent	of	external	debt.			
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Zambia	entered	the	HIPC	II	Initiative	in	December	2000,	when	it	qualified	for	the	programme’s	Decision	Point	(the	first	of	two	main	hurdles).	In	order	to	reach	the	Decision	Point	in	2000,	government	had	to	meet	two	main	criteria.	Firstly,	it	had	to	have	a	record	of	commitment	to	reform.	In	Zambia’s	case,	a	commitment	to	privatisation	was	especially	important.	The	eventual	sale	of	Zambia	Consolidated	Copper	Mines	(ZCCM)	in	2000	sealed	Zambia’s	progress	towards	the	Decision	Point	i.e.	admittance	to	the	HIPC	II	Initiative.	The	IMF’s	2000	report	on	Zambia’s	Decision	Point	is	instructive	in	this	regard.	It	describes	the	MMD’s	macroeconomic	reforms	as	poor,	but	regards	the	structural	reforms	in	a	much	more	positive	light:			
…	Zambia	has	moved	from	a	position	in	1990	when	the	economy	was	
dominated	by	state-owned	enterprises,	government-administered	price	
structures	and	protective	mechanisms	to	a	position	today	characterized	by	
an	open	economy	in	which	prices	are	largely	market	determined	and	the	
greater	part	of	the	previously	state-owned	enterprises	have	been	
restructured	and	divested	to	the	private	sector,	including	the	all-important	
copper	company,	Zambia	Consolidated	Copper	Mines	(ZCCM).246		The	second	criterion	for	reaching	the	Decision	Point	was	the	completion	of	an	Interim	Poverty	Reduction	Strategy	Paper	(I-PRSP),	to	be	turned	into	a	full	PRSP.	Government	had	little	control	over	the	implementation	timeline,	which	was	set	by	the	BWIs,	and	the	process	to	be	followed,	which	was	stipulated	in	the	terms	of	reference	for	preparing	PRSPs.247.	The	MoF	wrote	the	I-PRSP	between	March	and	June	2000.	Due	to	the	limited	amount	of	time	available,	no	other	stakeholders	were	included	in	the	process		In	order	to	qualify	for	the	Completion	Point	of	the	HIPC	–	the	programme’s	final	hurdle	–	government	had	to	meet	a	myriad	of	conditions.		One	of	the	most	critical	was	to	have	implemented	a	PRSP	for	a	minimum	of	a	year	to	the	satisfaction	of	the	Fund	and	Bank.	Also	included	were	several	conditions	related	to	reform	in	the	health	and	education	sectors.	Importantly,	several	of	the	HIPC	conditions	related	to	economic	policy	and	include:	the	implementation	of	a	Medium-Term	Expenditure	Framework	(MTEF),	the	issuance	of	bidding	documents	for	the	sale	of	a	controlling	stake	in	state-owned	power	company	ZESCO,	and	the	issuance	of	bidding	documents	for	the	sale	of	a	majority	share	in	the	Zambian	National	Commercial	Bank	(ZNCB).248	The	MTEF	was	to	be	prepared	by	the	MoF	and	then	approved	by	cabinet.	It	stipulated	medium-term	spending	priorities	over	a	three-
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year	period	and	had	to	meet	with	BWI	approval	along	with	the	PRSP.	Furthermore,	once	the	Completion	Point	had	been	reached,	public	accounts	had	to	be	opened	to	the	BWIs	to	conduct	regular	audits.				Work	began	on	writing	the	PRSP	in	December	2000,	when	Zambia	reached	the	Decision	Point	of	the	HIPC	II	Initiative.	In	April	2002,	the	final	PRSP	draft	was	endorsed	by	cabinet	and	in	May	2002	it	was	endorsed	by	the	boards	of	the	IMF	and	World	Bank	(See	Table	4).			
Table	4:	PRSP	process	timeline	Mar	2000	 MoF	begins	work	on	I-PRSP	June	2000	 MoF	completes	work	on	I-PRSP	June	2000	 I-PRSP	submitted	to	and	approve	by	BWI	boards	Aug	2000	 First	stakeholder	meeting,	Thematic	Working	Groups	(TWGs)	established	Nov	2000	 Workshop	with	cabinet	and	parliamentary	committees		Dec	2000	 Entry	into	HIPC	II	Initiative	April-May	2001	 TWGs	hold	district	consultations	in	all	provinces		June-Sept	2001	 TWGs	finalise	chapters	and	send	to	MoF	Oct	2001	 MoF	collates	chapters	into	draft	PRSP	Presents	first	PRSP	draft	for	comment	at	workshop	Mar	2002	 TWG	chairs	discuss	second	draft	PRSP	Apr	2002	 PRSP	endorsed	by	cabinet	May	2002		 PRSP	endorsed	by	IMF	and	WB	boards	July	2002	 Official	launch	of	PRSP	2002-2004	Sept	2002	 PRSP	becomes	TNDP	2002-2005		It	is	noteworthy	that	a	PRSP	draft	never	went	through	parliament	for	discussion	or	approval.	The	bypassing	of	parliament	set	a	precedent	for	aid	dispersal	in	the	years	following	the	PRSP.249	Incoming	aid	funds	often	went	directly	to	government	or	to	CSOs,	often	without	any	input	from	Zambia’s	formal	political	institutions.			Government	had	hoped	to	reach	the	HIPC	Completion	Point	by	2003.	However,	this	was	delayed	by	the	partial	privatisation	of	the	ZNCB	and	by	government’s	apparent	unwillingness	to	privatise	ZESCO.	The	BWIs	would	eventually	waive	the	“nonobservance”	of	these	conditions	in	March	2005	due	to	progress	made	elsewhere,	such	as:	social	sector	reforms,	public	expenditure	management,	and	the	implementation	of	the	PRSP.250		
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The	Fifth	National	Development	Plan		When	Mwanawasa	told	parliament	in	January	2002	that	national	development	planning	would	be	reintroduced,	the	PRSP	was	just	months	away	from	being	completed.	A	new	Planning	and	Economic	Management	Department	(PEMD)	was	created	in	the	Ministry	of	Finance,	which	was	renamed	the	Ministry	of	Finance	and	National	Planning	(MoFNP).	The	MoFNP	was	tasked	with	creating	a	TNDP	by	the	middle	of	the	year	and	then	with	creating	the	FNDP	by	2005.	The	MoFNP	therefore	adopted	the	PRSP	as	the	TNDP	2002-2005	in	September	2002,	although	a	few	sections	were	added	that	were	not	included	in	the	initial	PRSP.	In	mid-2004,	the	MoFNP	announced	that	it	would	not	issue	a	second	PRSP	once	it	reached	the	Completion	Point	in	2005.	Instead,	the	FNDP	2006-2010	would	take	the	place	of	a	second	PRSP.			
Process	and	organisational	structures	
 The	process	for	creating	the	FNDP	resembled	very	closely	that	of	the	PRSP.251	Sector	Advisory	Groups	(SAGs)		–	modelled	on	the	Thematic	Working	Groups	(TWGs)	used	for	the	PRSP	–	were	established	to	create	the	draft	chapters	that	would	be	collated	by	consultants	into	the	single	FNDP	document.252	The	SAGs	were	chaired	by	permanent	secretaries	from	the	line	ministry	concerned	and	included	representatives	of	civil	society,	donors,	and	the	private	sector.	The	SAG’s	would	report	to	the	PEMD.	The	PEMD	in	turn	would	report	to	a	National	Technical	Committee	(NTC),	which	would	provide	oversight	on	operational	issues.	Finally,	a	National	Steering	Committee	(NSC)	was	established	to	oversee	the	entire	process	(See	Figure	1	and	Table	5).	For	both	the	NTC	and	NSC,	the	chairs	were	provided	by	cabinet	and	the	secretaries	were	provided	the	PEMD.	Government	had	requested	support	for	the	process	of	putting	together	the	FNDP	and	in	response	donors	created	Coordination	and	Technical	Groups	(CTGs).	In	some	cases,	donors	prepared	comments	and	submitted	them	directly	to	the	NSC.	Three	consultants	were	employed	by	the	MoFNP	to	assist	the	PEMD	with	editing	and	compiling	the	various	draft	chapters	into	a	single	FNDP	document.	Consultants	were	also	employed,	in	some	instances,	to	assist	SAGs	with	the	preparation	of	draft	chapters.		In	addition	to	the	government	run	process,	civil	society	ran	a	‘shadow	FNDP	process’	and	handed	a	‘shadow	FNDP’	to	the	PEMD	in	November	2005.	This	
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process	was	done	under	the	auspices	of	the	donor-funded	Civil	Society	for	Poverty	Reduction	(CSPR),	which	was	led	by	the	Jesuit	Centre	for	Theological	Reflection	and	had	approximately	ninety	member	organisations.	CSPR	was	first	formed	to	represent	civil-society	in	the	PRSP	design	process,	as	required	by	the	BWIs.		
Figure	1:	National	working	structure	for	FNDP	design	
		
	
Table	5:	Bodies	involved	with	the	FNDP	process	
Body	 Responsibility		 Members	Cabinet	Office	 Chaired	NSC	and	NTC		 –	National	Steering	Committee	(NSC)	 Oversight	of	entire	process	 Permanent	Secretary	from	Cabinet	Office,	MoFNP	officials	National	Technical	Committee	(NTC)	 Operations		 Cabinet	Office	and	MoFNP	officials	Coordinating	and	technical	groups	(CTGs)	 Provide	technical	assistance	to	MoFNP		Comment	on	drafts		
Donors	(some	donors	provided	direct	support	and	comments	outside	of	CTG	structure)	
Planning	and	Economic	Management	Department	(PEMD)	
Provide	secretariat	of	NSC	and	NTC			Administer	process			Coordinate	SAGs,	ministries,	and	consultants		
Located	within	the	MoFNP	
Sector	Advisory	Groups	(SAGs)	 Develop	sector-specific	draft	chapters	
CSOs,	donors,	private	sector	representatives		Chair:	Permanent	Secretary	of	relevant	ministry	
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Body	 Responsibility		 Members	
Line	ministries	
Chair	sector	specific	SAGs		In	the	latter	part	of	the	process,	some	line	ministries	conducted	revisions	to	First	Drafts	without	consulting	SAGs	
–	
Consultants		
Three	consultants	assisted	DPEM	to	edit	and	collate	draft	chapters	into	single	document		Some	Zero	Draft	chapters	were	prepared	by	consultants	in	consultations	with	SAGs	
Employed	by	MoFNDP	through	a	tender	process	
	The	process	for	actually	drafting	the	chapters	and	collating	them	into	a	single	semi-final	document	took	approximately	six	to	seven	months	between	August	2005	and	Feb	2006	(See	Table	6).	A	final	draft	was	presented	at	a	National	Stakeholder	Workshop	in	Lusaka	in	July	2006	to	receive	feedback	from	donors,	CSOs,	and	Permanent	Secretaries	from	the	Cabinet	Office.	Following	the	workshop,	the	FNDP	was	finalised	and	submitted	to	cabinet	in	September	2006.	In	the	same	month,	Mwanawasa	was	re-elected	for	his	second	term	in	the	2006	general	elections.	As	a	result,	the	FNDP	was	only	ratified	by	cabinet	in	December	2006.	The	FNDP	2006-2010	was	therefore	launched	in	December	2006.	The	National	Long-Term	Vision,	entitled	Vision	2030,	was	launched	at	the	same	time.			
Table	6:	FNDP	process	timeline	Jan	2002	 Mwanawasa	announces	reintroduction	of	planning		Jan-Feb	2005	 National	Steering	Committee	(NSC)	established	National	Technical	Committee	(NTC)	established	Feb	2005	 Initial	‘Roadmap’	issued	for	FNDP	design	process	
April	2005	 MoFNP	holds	meetings	with	CSOs,	donors,	SAGs,	Permanent	Secretaries	(of	line	ministries)	Civil	Society	for	Poverty	Reduction	(CSPR)	begins	development	process	for	‘shadow	FNDP’	May	2005	 Donors	submit	Issue	Paper	on	FNDP	draft	outline	MoFNP	request	technical	support	from	donors	Coordinating	and	Technical	Groups	(CTGs)	established	by	donors	June	2005	 Orientation	workshop	for	consultants	Aug-Nov	2005	 Draft	chapters	prepared	by	SAGs	or	by	working	groups	within		SAGs	Zero	Drafts	and	then	First	Drafts	submitted	to	Planning	and	Economic	Management	Department	(PEMD)	Nov	2005	 CSPR	submits	finalised	‘shadow	FNDP’	draft	to	PEMD	Dec	2005	–	Feb	2006	 Further	chapter	revision	in	line	ministries		Draft	chapters	edited	and	consolidated	by	consultants	CTGs	provide	direct	comments	to	NSC	
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Jan	2006	 Revised	‘Roadmap’	issued	July-Aug	2006	 National	Stakeholder	Workshop		Comments	from	donors,	CSOs,	NSC	and	NTC	chairs	FNDP	revised	by	DPEM	and	consultants,	in	consultation	with	line	ministries	Sept	2006	 FNDP	submitted	to	cabinet	National	elections	Dec	2006	 Cabinet	approves	FNDP		FNDP	2006-2010	launched	National	Long-Term	Vision	(Vision	2030)	launched		
Planning	instruments	
 While	the	PRSP	and	TNDP	may	not	have	been	exactly	the	same	policy	document,	they	were	often	referred	to	–	in	both	government	and	BWI	communications	–	collectively	as	the	‘PRSP/TNDP’.	The	FNDP,	on	the	other	hand,	was	an	attempt	to	create	a	comprehensive	national	development	plan.253	The	FNDP	is	a	medium-term	strategy,	which	is	guided	by	the	National	Long-Term	Vision	(Vision	2030).	The	overall	aim	of	Vision	2030	is	for	Zambia	to	be	a	middle-income	country	by	2030.254	It	contains	numerous	broad	social	and	economic	goals,	in	addition	to	seven	principles	and	twenty-one	national	characteristics	to	which	it	aspires.	The	FNDP	is	characterised	as	providing	more	concrete,	high-level	steps	deemed	necessary	to	move	the	country	towards	Vision	2030	over	the	five-year	period	between	2006	and	2010.	These	steps	include:	establishing	the	total	resources	available	–	the	resource	envelope	–	over	the	five	years	(including	domestic	revenue,	domestic	debt,	and	international	loans	and	grants),	defining	a	strategy	of	spending	per	sector	(include	spending	allocations	per	sector),	and	laying	out	broad	development	policies	(such	as	the	FNDP’s	focus	on	agriculture	as	a	means	of	poverty	alleviation).			A	MTEF	was	thought	of	as	the	first	step	towards	operationalising	the	FNDP	(See	Table	7).	The	MTEF	was	introduced	in	the	early-2000s	as	part	of	an	expenditure	reform	programme	under	the	HIPC	II	Initiative.	Alongside	the	PRSP,	it	was	a	high	priority	condition	of	the	HIPC	programme.	The	MTEF	was	meant	to	provide	the	total	annual	budget	estimate	and	allocations	for	each	year	in	a	three-year	period.	It	was	created	by	the	MoFNP	and	was	meant	to	be	guided	by	the	FNDP	and	the	amount	of	available	resources	at	the	time.	Whereas	the	FNDP	discussed	spending	at	the	national	and	sectoral	level,	the	MTEF	defined	specific	allocations	to	what	is	referred	to	as	Ministries,	Provinces,	and	other	Spending	Agencies	(MPSAs).	The	annual	budget	should,	in	theory,	not	deviate	much	from	that	laid	out	in	the	MTEF.	Finally,	according	to	the	FNDP,	line	ministries	were	meant	to	develop	annual	work	plans,	which	were	supposed	to	indicate	the	timelines	and	
 
253 Government of the Republic of Zambia, "Fifth National Development Plan." 
254 "Vision 2030." 
 58 
activities	to	be	undertaken	for	specific	projects	and	programmes	during	the	year.	It	is	not	currently	clear	whether	any	ministries	had	actually	created	these	work	plans.		
Table	7:	Planning	instruments	
	 Vision	2030	 NDP	 MTEF	 Budget	 Work	plan	
Responsible	
Department	 MoFNP	 MoFNP	 MoFNP	 MoFNP	 Line	ministry	
Timeframe		 30	years	 5	years		 3	years		 1	year	 1	year	
Description	
Broad	social	and	economic	goals	
National	and	sectoral	development	strategies		Outline	spending	priorities		Estimate	resource	envelope		Delineate	public	investment	to	be	made	over	the	period.	(For	reasons	to	be	discussed	later	in	the	chapter,	the	FNDP	actually	contained	very	little	capital	expenditure)	
Estimate	budget	ceilings		Estimate	MPSA	resource	allocations		
Estimate	total	annual	expenditure		Allocate	resources	to	MPSAs	
Detailed	implementation	plans	
	The	above	table	represents	how	the	planning	instruments	were	meant	to	operate	and	interact	with	each	other	in	theory.	The	reality	was	somewhat	different.	For	example,	the	MTEF	2006-2008	was	issued	in	November	2005,	a	full	year	before	the	FNDP	was	launched	in	December	2006.	The	MTEF	was	therefore	created	by	the	MoFNP	on	the	basis	of	“anticipating	[the	issues]	put	forwards	in	the	on-going	consultations	for	the	FNDP”.255		Perhaps	the	largest	problem	is	the	extent	to	which	the	MTEF	and	annual	budget	proposed	by	the	MoFNP	relate	to	actual	expenditure.	The	findings	of	a	Public	
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Financial	Management	Performance	Report	issued	by	government	in	2005	are	informative:			
A	comparison	of	outturns	against	the	original	budget	over	the	past	three	
years	[2002-2004]	indicates	that,	in	aggregate,	the	budget	is	an	inaccurate	
measure	of	actual	expenditures	due	to	weaknesses	in	fiscal	discipline,	
expenditure	control,	and	budgetary	planning.256		The	FNDP	describes	the	annual	budget	as	“the	primary	instrument	for	implementing	the	plan”.257	It	is	therefore	concerning	that,	in	the	period	just	before	FNDP	was	to	be	implemented,	there	was	a	loose	correlation	between	intended	and	actual	spending.	This	discrepancy	brings	into	question	the	extent	to	which	annual	budgets	were	actually	guided	by	the	policies	laid	out	in	the	FNDP.	Hinfelaar	and	Sichone	do	note	that	there	appears	to	have	been	an	improvement	in	the	MoFNP’s	budgetary	control	and	expenditure	management	between	2005	and	2008.258	Nevertheless,	the	ministry	remained	institutionally	weak	relative	to	the	spending	ministries	where	public	finances	were	less	well	managed.	In	addition,	the	budgeting	process	itself	was	open	to	interference	from	cabinet	ministers,	leading	to	unexpected	spending	that	was	not	aligned	with	the	FNDP’s	polices.259		
The	plan	itself		
 The	theme	of	the	FNDP	is	“broad-based	wealth	and	job	creation	through	citizenry	participation	and	technological	advancement”.260	The	stated	goals	of	the	FNDP	are	growth	(annual	average	of	7%),	poverty	and	inequality	reduction,	and	infrastructure	development.			Public	spending	for	the	period	2006-2010,	without	the	programmes	and	projects	of	the	FNDP,	was	estimated	at	K59,	641	billion	(this	is	referred	to	in	the	FNDP	as	the	baseline	scenario).261	Government	expected	to	cover	K48,	442	billion	(81%)	of	this	total	through	domestic	revenue	and	some	concessional	lending	from	multilaterals.	Government	expected	bilateral	agencies	and	international	lenders	to	cover	the	remaining	K11,	198	billion	(19%)	of	expenditure	in	the	baseline	scenario.		
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	The	programmes	and	projects	of	the	FNDP	were	estimated	to	cost	K2,	982	billion	over	and	above	the	baseline	scenario.262	The	FNDP	refers	to	this	amount	of	almost	K3,	000	billion	as	the	resource	gap.	As	the	FNDP	only	forecast	a	marginal	increase	in	domestic	revenue	over	the	five	years,	it	states	that	the	resource	gap	would	have	to	be	financed	by	external	grants	and	loans.	This	scenario	would	involve	donors	increasing	ODA	from	slightly	less	than	six	percent	of	GDP	in	2006	to	just	under	eight	percent	of	GDP	in	2010.			Although	the	FNDP	provides	a	breakdown	of	spending	per	sector	and	the	amount	to	be	covered	by	government	and	donors	respectively,	it	does	not	indicate	how	much	of	the	planned	spending	is	intended	to	be	current	and	how	much	would	be	dedicated	to	capital	expenditure.	It	seems	safe	to	assume,	however,	that	the	majority	of	intended	spending	over	the	FNDP	period	was	planned	to	be	recurrent.	Current	expenditure	was	forecast	at	an	annual	average	of	17.68%	of	GDP	over	the	period	in	the	baseline	scenario,	compared	to	an	annual	average	of	18.4%	of	GDP	in	the	FNDP	scenario.263	On	the	other	hand,	capital	expenditure	in	the	baseline	scenario	was	estimated	at	an	annual	average	of	6.1%	of	GDP.	Capital	expenditure	in	the	FNDP	scenario	(which	assumes	that	the	resource	gap	is	filled)	was	forecast	at	an	annual	average	of	7%	of	GDP.	This	is	in	stark	contrast	to	the	country’s	first	NDP,	which	stipulated	that	an	average	of	20%	of	GDP	would	be	allocated	to	capital	expenditure	annually.264				It	is	notable	that	large	energy	and	infrastructure	investments	that	were	planned	during	the	period	were	excluded	from	the	FNDP.	These	include	energy	projects	Kariba	North	Bank,	estimated	to	cost	$300	million,	and	Kafue	Gorge	Lower,	valued	at	$600	million.265	These	projects	were	apparently	intended	to	be	financed	by	public	private	partnerships	or	by	private	capital	entirely.	In	2005	kwacha,	the	Kafue	Gorge	Lower	project	would	cost	K2,	775	billion.266	This	is	only	slightly	less	than	the	K2,	982	billion	resource	gap	created	by	the	FNDP’s	development	programmes.			Zambia	reached	the	HIPC	II	Initiative	completion	point	in	April	2005,	the	same	month	that	the	stakeholder	workshop	was	held	at	the	beginning	of	the	FNDP	design	process.	Reaching	the	completion	point	meant	that	the	IMF	and	World	Bank	had	agreed	to	write	off	most	of	Zambia’s	debt	that	they	held.	Importantly	though,	debt	relief	itself	would	likely	take	place	over	a	number	of	years.	
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Moreover,	the	write-off	was	only	granted	on	the	“expectation	that	prudent	macroeconomic	policies	and	structural	reforms	are	maintained”.267			Finance	minister	Peter	Magande	had	assumed	office	in	July	2003,	a	few	months	after	the	IMF	had	suspended	the	dispersal	of	a	$100	million	Poverty	Reduction	Growth	Facility	(PRGF)	in	March	2003	due	to	government’s	declaring	a	surprisingly	large	fiscal	deficit.	One	of	Magande’s	core	concerns	was	to	“get	Zambia’s	relationship	with	the	Bretton	Woods	institutions	back	in	good	standing”.268	This	would	involve	fulfilling	Zambia’s	commitments	to	economic	reform	made	to	the	BWIs	earlier	in	the	decade.	He	delivered	his	first	full	budget	on	6	February	2004	with	the	theme	‘Austerity	for	Posterity’.	Magande	makes	clear	that:			
In	2004,	the	Government’s	focus	was	on	fiscal	prudence	and	austerity	by	
avoiding	wastage	and	directing	resources	to	priority	areas	as	a	prerequisite	
for	securing	the	new	PRGF	and	reaching	the	‘completion	point’	of	the	HIPC	
Initiative.269		Although	Zambia	reached	the	HIPC	completion	point	before	it	began	to	design	the	FNDP,	it	would	have	to	continue	with	economic	reforms	in	order	to	ensure	that	debt	relief	was	actually	realised.	In	addition,	in	mid-2004,	Magande	re-negotiated	the	three-year	PRGF	that	came	with	similar	conditionalities.	It	seems	then	that	capital	expenditure	in	the	FNDP	was,	in	part,	constrained	by	government’s	commitment	to	adhere	to	the	conditions	of	its	agreements	with	the	international	lenders.	This	point	is	supported	by	the	MTEF	2006-2008,	which	states	“Government’s	medium-term	fiscal	stance	for	the	period	2006-2008	is	consolidation	so	as	to	promote	macroeconomic	stability”.270			There	is	also	a	more	basic	reason	for	the	limited	amount	of	capital	expenditure	in	the	FNDP.	As	seen	earlier,	privatisation	–	particularly	privatisation	of	the	mines	–	was	a	key	condition	for	entry	in	the	HIPC	programme.	Under	pressure	from	the	BWIs,	and	with	copper	prices	depressed,	government	entered	into	Development	Agreements	(DAs)	with	individual	mines.	The	DAs	superseded	existing	mining	regulations	and	offered	extremely	generous	taxation	terms.	As	a	result,	government	revenue	from	mines	remained	relatively	flat	despite	the	uptick	in	commodity	prices	in	2003.271	When	the	FNDP	was	being	created,	therefore,	government	simply	did	not	have	the	additional	resources	for	public	investments.	
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This	is	a	point	made	by	Moses	Banda,	Special	Economic	Advisor	to	Mwanawasa	from	2002	to	2007,	who	observed	that	“Government	could	not	allocate	resources	that	it	didn’t	have”.272		This	statement	appears	to	be	supported	by	the	MTEF	2006-2008,	which	claims	that	external	resources	are	required	to	cover	85%	of	capital	expenditure	over	the	years	2005-2007.273	Thereafter,	this	amount	was	expected	to	drop	to	roughly	70%.			
Explanations	for	the	reintroduction	of	development	planning		
Planning	as	a	means	of	ODA	management			Towards	the	late-1990s,	there	was	increasing	recognition	amongst	government	officials,	donors,	and	civil	society,	that	the	abolition	of	the	National	Commission	for	Development	Planning	(NCDP)	had	been	a	mistake.274	Bilateral	agencies	and	authorities	began	to	realise	that	the	absence	of	a	central	development	policy	was	hindering	the	effective	implementation	and	coordination	of	ODA	activities.			In	the	absence	of	a	central	development	strategy,	donors	began	to	bypass	government	and	cut	down	on	budgetary	support.	Instead,	the	bilateral	agencies	chose	to	fund	projects	and	NGOs	directly	or	to	send	funds	to	the	ministries	involved.	This	resulted	in	a	profusion	of	unrelated	development	projects;	increased	administrative	costs	for	local	officials;	and	no	central	government	oversight	to	ensure	donor	resources	were	being	used	effectively.			In	light	of	declining	aid	efficacy,	donors	established	a	Harmonisation	in	Practice	(HIP)	group	in	2002	that	attempted	to	coordinate	their	activities	and	to	better	align	ODA	with	government’s	development	priorities.275	The	group	consisted	of	seven	countries:	Denmark,	Finland,	Ireland,	the	Netherlands,	Norway,	Sweden	and	the	UK.	The	following	year,	the	group	expanded	to	include	twelve	donor	countries	and	was	renamed	Wider	Harmonisation	in	Practice	(WHIP).	One	of	WHIP’s	key	suggestions	was	for	government	to	create	an	aid	policy	that	would	provide	guidelines	for	the	coordination	of	donor	activity.276			
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In	September	2005,	the	MoFNP	released	its	Aid	Policy	and	Strategy,	although	cabinet	would	only	endorse	it	in	2007.277	The	objective	of	the	aid	policy	was,	in	essence,	to	channel	aid	into	the	national	budget	and,	from	there,	for	resource	allocation	to	be	determined	according	to	the	priorities	laid	out	in	the	FNDP.	For	the	most	part,	donors	appeared	to	be	on	board	with	this.	WHIP	saw	the	next	stage	in	its	evolution	at	an	April	2007	Consultative	Group	meeting,	where	the	Joint	Aid	Strategy	for	Zambia	(JASZ)	was	launched.	The	JASZ	had	seven	key	objectives,	the	first	of	which	was	to	align	ODA	with	the	FNDP,	Vision	2030,	and	the	Aid	Policy	and	Strategy.278	The	JASZ	was	signed	by	the	twelve	bilateral	agencies	in	addition	to	the	European	Commission,	the	United	Nations,	the	World	Bank,	and	the	African	Development	Bank.			Government	and	bilateral	agencies	saw	the	reintroduction	of	planning	as	a	means	of	improving	the	efficiency	and	efficacy	of	the	aid	system	in	Zambia.	This	was	certainly	a	high	priority	for	the	Mwanawasa	administration,	as	in	the	early-2000s	Zambia	was	still	highly	depended	on	aid.	Over	the	period	2000-2005,	aid	averaged	43%	of	the	annual	national	budget	with	a	2001	peak	of	53%.279	Fraser	therefore	argues	that	planning	was	“conceived	principally	as	a	solution	to	problems	of	aid	management”.280		While	bilateral	aid	agencies	and	recipient	governments	were	beginning	negotiations	over	aid	efficacy	in	the	early-2000s,	Zambia	was	experiencing	high	levels	of	political	contestation	and	the	first	change	of	power	since	1991.	This	political	context	suggests	that	domestic	political	factors	likely	had	an	important	role	to	play	in	the	reintroduction	of	planning.	Put	differently,	certain	developments	in	Zambia’s	political	landscape	in	the	early-2000s	resulted	in	the	executive’s	being	favourably	disposed	to	the	reinstatement	of	development	planning.	There	are	two	factors	(or	explanations)	that	are	relevant	in	this	regard.	The	first	explanation	speaks	to	the	logic	of	the	political	settlement	narrative	mentioned	in	the	Chapter	Two.	In	this	sense	the	reintroduction	of	planning	can	be	seen	as	part	of	an	attempt	by	Mwanawasa	to	build	a	coalition	to	reinforce	his	political	legitimacy.	The	second	explanation	speaks	to	the	role	of	ideas	in	shaping	political	interests	and	economic	policy-making.	Each	of	these	explanations	will	be	discussed	in	turn.			
Political	explanation		
 Levy	Mwanawasa	announced	the	reintroduction	of	planning	in	his	first	parliamentary	address	on	22	January	2002,	a	month	after	he	won	national	
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elections	on	27	December	2001.	Mwanawasa	garnered	just	29%	of	the	vote.	His	closest	competitor,	Anderson	Mazoka	of	the	United	Party	for	National	Development	(UPND),	attained	27%.	With	a	voter	turnout	of	1.7	million,	the	difference	between	the	two	amounted	to	just	33	997	votes.281		Although	the	MMD	was	still	the	largest	party	in	parliament,	it	had	lost	its	majority.	It	secured	69	of	150	seats,	while	UPND	and	UNIP	took	49	and	13	seats	respectively.282	The	elections	themselves	were	marred	by	widespread	irregularities	and	inconsistencies	in	vote	counting.	The	European	Union	observer	commission	expressed	concern	with	the	results,	though	it	took	no	action.283	Opposition	parties	unsuccessfully	contested	the	results	in	court	and	several	observers	believe	that	the	MMD	used	its	access	to	state	resources	to	influence	the	outcome	of	the	poll.284			Mwanawasa	had	been	appointed	as	the	MMD’s	presidential	candidate	in	late-August	2001	four	months	prior	to	the	elections	in	December	2001.	He	had	been	appointed	by	President	Frederick	Chiluba,	who	had	recently	given	up	a	highly	controversial	third-term	bid.	Mwanawasa	was	a	lawyer	who	had	briefly	served	as	Kaunda’s	solicitor	general	in	1985.	He	would	go	on	to	play	an	important	role	in	the	founding	of	the	MMD	and	serve	as	the	party’s	vice	president	from	1991	until	1994,	when	he	quit	over	the	corruption	of	Chiluba’s	administration	and	an	apparently	strained	working	relationship	with	Chiluba.285			Though	the	MMD	had	managed	to	install	Mwanawasa	as	president	at	the	end	of	2001,	its	electoral	victory	had	come	at	the	expense	of	his	political	legitimacy.286	His	party	had	lost	a	significant	amount	of	electoral	support	in	the	2001	polls	and	his	position	within	in	the	party	was	compromised.	While	Mwanawasa	was	the	president	of	the	republic,	Chiluba	retained	the	presidency	of	the	MMD.	Chiluba	had	chosen	Mwanawasa	when	he	realised	that	a	third	term	was	no	longer	attainable.	Mwanawasa	was	chosen	because	he	was	a	compromise	candidate.287	His	low	profile	within	the	party	and	the	fact	that	he	represented	a	minority	ethnic	group	meant	his	appointment	would	not	lead	to	any	further	splits	within	the	MMD.	Chiluba	wanted	a	presidential	candidate	that	he	could	control,	which	was	blatantly	clear	to	Mwanawasa	–	according	to	his	official	biography.288	He	was,	therefore,	determined	to	show	that	he	was	not	Chiluba’s	puppet.	Moreover,	
 
281 Burnell, "Zambia's 2001 elections: the tyranny of small decisions,'non-decisions' and'not decisions'," 
1104. 
282 Ibid. 
283 Rakner, Foreign aid and democratic consolidation in Zambia. 
284 Burnell, "Zambia's 2001 elections: the tyranny of small decisions,'non-decisions' and'not decisions'," 
1116. 
285 Amos Malupenga, Levy Patrick Mwanawasa: An Incentive for Posterity (Port Elizabeth: NISC, 
2009). 
286 Erdmann and Simutanyi, Transition in Zambia: The Hybridisation of the Third Republic. 
287 Paget, "Internal Politics of the MMD, Zambia (Unpublished MSc Dissertation)," 35. 
288 Malupenga, Levy Patrick Mwanawasa: An Incentive for Posterity, 141. 
 65 
Mwanawasa	recognised	that	restoring	his	political	legitimacy	required	distancing	himself	from	Chiluba.289			Shortly	after	coming	to	power,	Mwanawasa	implemented	corruption	proceedings	against	Chiluba	and	several	of	his	allies.	Mwanawasa	was	able	to	secure	his	hold	on	the	MMD	in	July	2002,	when	parliament	approved	his	request	to	remove	the	immunity	from	prosecution	that	Chiluba	had	enjoyed	as	an	ex-president.	Though	Chiluba	challenged	the	decision,	it	was	ultimately	upheld	by	the	Supreme	Court	and	he	was	arrested	in	August	2003	on	charges	of	corruption.	Mwanawasa	also	began	to	remove	Chiluba	loyalists	from	positions	of	power	in	the	civil	service	and	MMD.290	He	courted	opposition	parties	and	had	signed	a	cooperation	agreement	with	Kaunda’s	UNIP.	By	the	middle	of	July	2002,	Mwanawasa	had	replaced	the	entire	cabinet,	save	for	one	minister	and	one	junior	minister.291	Additionally,	most	of	the	new	ministers	were	outsiders	i.e.	opposition	members	or	former	opposition	members	who	had	joined	the	MMD	on	being	appointed	to	cabinet.			Perhaps	one	of	the	most	high-profile	appointments	from	outside	the	MMD	was	that	of	Ng’andu	Peter	Magande	as	finance	minister	in	early	2003.	Magande	was	a	long-serving	technocrat	whose	career	in	the	civil	service	began	in	the	1970s.	Magande	was	one	of	Mazoka’s	closest	advisors	and	had	joined	the	UPND	shortly	after	its	establishment	in	1998.	In	his	autobiography,	Magande	describes	being	“an	active	member	of	Mazoka’s	‘kitchen	cabinet’”	and	of	being	“intensely	involved	in	the	operations	of	the	UPND”.	292	He	also	implies	that	he	had	a	hand	in	defining	policies	that	would	constitute	the	UPND	manifesto,	launched	in	April	2000.	It	should	be	noted	that	Magande	may	be	overestimating	his	role	in	formal	policy-making	within	the	UPND.	Nevertheless,	he	does	appear	to	have	been	a	close	–	if	informal	–	advisor	to	Mazoka.	While	Magande’s	appointment	served	to	weaken	the	UPND,	Mwanawasa	also	acknowledged	that	were	no	similarly	qualified	candidates	for	finance	minister	within	the	MMD.293	This	speaks	to	Mwanawasa’s	desire	to	create	a	capable	and	technocratic	cabinet.294		Widespread	public	disaffection	with	the	corruption	and	economic	mismanagement	of	the	Chiluba	administration	during	the	1990s	had,	at	least	in	part,	contributed	towards	the	MMD’s	poor	performance	in	the	2001	polls.	Mwanawasa	realised	that	he	needed	to	distance	himself	from	Chiluba,	not	only	
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politically,	but	in	terms	of	policy	as	well.295	When	Chiluba	took	office	in	1991,	Zambians	were	told	that	they	would	have	to	bear	the	costs	of	structural	adjustment	in	the	short-term	in	order	to	enjoy	the	benefits	of	a	revived	economy	further	down	the	line.	By	the	beginning	of	the	new	millennium,	however,	these	benefits	had	failed	to	materialise	for	the	majority	of	Zambians.	Indeed,	poverty	and	inequality	had	increased	during	the	decade.	The	re-introduction	of	development	planning	gave	Mwanawasa	the	means	by	which	he	could	be	seen	to	be	responding	to	these	issues	while	still	maintaining	the	macroeconomic	stability	and	fiscal	responsibility	required	by	the	HIPC	programme.			On	the	whole,	there	were	few	substantive	policy	differences	between	the	parties	contesting	the	2001	elections.296	Nevertheless,	there	are	some	differences	that	are	worth	mentioning.	Most	notably,	for	the	purposes	of	this	paper,	the	policy	idea	of	re-implementing	planning	appears	to	have	originated	from	the	UPND	and	not	the	MMD.297	The	MMD’s	manifesto	from	the	2001	elections	does	not	mention	planning	or	any	attempt	to	create	a	stronger	role	for	government	in	the	economy.298	While	it	acknowledges	the	need	for	some	poverty-targeted	programmes,	it	essentially	recommends	a	continuation	of	the	economic	reforms	of	the	previous	decade.	The	UPND	manifesto,	on	the	other	hand,	is	heavily	critical	of	the	reforms	of	the	previous	decade,	referring	to	the	1990s	as	“a	lost	and	wasted	decade”.299	It	therefore	claims	that,	if	it	were	elected	to	power,	it	would	“restore	medium	and	long-term	development	planning”.300		The	reinstatement	of	planning	offered	the	opportunity,	not	only	to	strengthen	the	legitimacy	of	the	MMD,	but	also	to	undermine	the	main	opposition	by	co-opting	one	of	their	key	policies.	As	Sishuwa	notes,	it	is	the	same	tactic	that	Mwanawasa	would	use	in	2008	when	he	instituted	a	windfall	tax	on	copper	mining	and	increased	mining	royalties.301	The	idea	of	a	windfall	tax	was	widely	popular	and	was	first	touted	by	Patriotic	Front	(PF)	candidate	Michael	Sata	in	the	2006	elections.	Its	introduction	by	Mwanawasa	can	be	seen	as	an	attempt	to	weaken	the	opposition	PF	and	to	cement	his	political	legitimacy	with	the	electorate.	Hinfelaar	and	Cheeseman	appear	to	support	this	analysis	when	they	state	that	“[u]nder	Mwanawasa,	the	MMD	was	continually	repositioned	in	an	attempt to	head	off	the	threat	resulting	first	from	the	United	Party	of	National	Development	(UPND)	and	later	from	the	rise	of	the	PF”.302	Moses	Banda	(Special	
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Economic	Advisor	to	Mwanawasa	2002-2007)	appears	to	support	this	claim	when	he	notes	that,	by	re-implementing	planning,	“Mwanawasa	was	responding	to	the	views	of	the	opposition”.303		
Ideological	explanation		
 While	the	re-introduction	of	development	planning	served	a	political	purpose	for	Mwanawasa,	it	appears	to	have	had	ideological	drivers	as	well.	The	term	ideology	is	used	here	in	the	sense	used	by	Hirschman	when	he	described	“ideologies	of	economic	development”	as	“distinctive	beliefs,	principles	and	attitudes”.304	It	may	be	more	useful,	as	Sikkink	points	out,	to	speak	of	“ideas	about	development,	or	models	of	economic	policy-making”.305	Sikkink	goes	on	to	explain	that	sets	of	“ideas	connected	by	a	theory	or	group	of	theories	form	a	model	of	economic	development.	These	models	help	give	meaning	to	a	political	economic	situation	and	thus	permit	purposeful	action	within	it”.306		It	is	true	that,	as	Paget	argues,	combatting	corruption	formed	the	centrepiece	of	Mwanawasa’s	contest	with	Chiluba,	within	the	MMD	and	in	government.307	Arguably	though,	the	idea	of	development	planning	(the	idea	that	the	state	should	play	a	larger	role	in	the	country’s	development)	also	helped	to	shape	the	coalition	that	Mwanawasa	built	and	the	role	that	Mwanawasa	thought	the	government	should	fulfil.	As	Hinfelaar	and	Sichone	have	observed,	the	circumstances	surrounding	his	rise	to	power	“gave	him	a	strong	impetus	to	fight	corruption	and	to	establish	a	credible	and	technocratic	cabinet	to	rebuild	confidence	to	tackle	the	ailing	economy”.308		Blyth	argues	that	economic	ideas	can	act	as	“coalition-building	resources”	where,	in	times	of	uncertainty,	ideas	allow	actors	to	reframe	their	interests	and	allow	groups	of	actors	to	define	shared	courses	of	action.309	Mwanawasa	built	his	political	coalition	around	the	model	of	economic	development	shared	by	most	new	development	plans	around	the	world.	This	model	essentially	saw	government	attempt	to	expand	the	economy	at	a	rapid	rate;	maintain	macroeconomic	stability	and	tight	fiscal	controls;	increase	and	guide	public	investment	(without	compromising	macroeconomic	or	fiscal	targets),	stimulate	
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private	investment;	and	minimise	the	burden	placed	on	the	poor	through	the	provision	of	social	services	and	poverty-targeted	programmes.	For	most	of	the	actors	within	Mwanawasa’s	coalition,	their	legitimacy	among	their	constituents	was,	in	part,	determined	by	their	ability	to	deliver	on	the	promises	of	this	development	model.				As	Blyth	observes,	ideas	provide	normative	and	scientific	critiques	of	the	existing	economy.310	At	the	end	of	Chiluba’s	administration,	national	poverty	was	estimated	at	70	percent	and	Zambia	was	reclassified	from	a	middle-income	to	a	least	developed	country.311	These	failings	were	accordingly	attributed	to	a	combination	of	free	market	fundamentalism,	economic	mismanagement,	and	corruption	of	the	Chiluba	administration.	The	new	development	planning	provided	the	ideas	with	which	Mwanawasa	could	critique	the	economic	mismanagement	by	his	predecessor.	It	also	provided	him	with	the	means	to	describe	how	his	administration	would	address	these	failings.			The	importance	that	Mwanawasa	attached	to	the	reintroduction	of	planning	is	indicated	by	his	firing	of	finance	minister	Kasonde	in	2003.	Kasonde	had	first	been	finance	minister	under	Chiluba	from	1991	to	1993	and	was	a	key	driver	of	liberalisation	during	that	period.	Mwanawasa	fired	Kasonde	in	a	March	2003	cabinet	reshuffle,	while	Kasonde	was	attending	meetings	with	donors	in	Paris.	Mwanawasa	claimed	that	suspicious	transactions	had	occurred	at	the	ministry	during	Kasonde’s	tenure,	though	no	legal	proceedings	were	instigated.	Kasonde,	however,	attributed	his	dismissal	to	disagreements	over	policy	issues	with	Mwanawasa.	Explaining	further,	Kasonde	stated	that	“it	is	impossible	for	a	market	economist	to	agree	to	some	of	the	policies	that	have	socialist	connotations”.312			That	Mwanawasa	and	Kasonde	disagreed	about	fundamental	economic	policy	concepts	seems	likely,	given	Moses	Banda’s	description	of	Kasonde	as	“a	hard	core	reformer	who	always	argued	that	the	reforms	were	a	success	and	that	they	needed	a	little	more	time	for	the	expected	benefits	to	manifest	themselves”.313	Certainly,	Magande	and	Mwanawasa	were	much	more	aligned	in	terms	of	economic	policy.	Magande’s	career	included	a	stint	as	“national	planner	at	the	NCDP”	in	the	1980s,	where	he	"superintended	over	the	production	and	coordination	of	the	national	development	programmes	of	all	the	ministries	and	in	all	sectors	of	the	Zambian	economy”.314	
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	Magande	has	described	the	FNDP	as	“the	herald	of	the	restoration	of	national	long-term	planning	in	Zambia”.315	The	move	to	reintroduce	national	development	planning	appears	to	have	had	broad	political	support	within	government	structures.	According	to	Magande,	a	provision	to	“compel	the	government	of	the	day	to	prepare	an	annual	budget	in	conformity	with	medium	and	long-term	development	plans”	was	included	in	the	draft	constitution	that	was	being	revised	at	the	time.316	The	purpose	of	this	provision	was	to	“rule	out	Zambia	being	governed	without	a	development	plan	as	had	happened	between	1991	and	2002”.317			
Conclusion 	This	chapter	has	assessed	the	main	external	and	internal	factors	that	led	the	Zambian	government	to	reintroduce	planning	in	2002,	a	decade	after	abandoning	it.	In	relation	to	the	former,	it	was	argued	that	planning	was	reinstated	as	a	means	for	government	to	improve	the	efficiency	and	efficacy	of	aid	dispersal	to	the	country.	More	specifically,	a	national	development	strategy	was	one	of	the	pillars	of	an	aid	harmonisation	process	occurring	in	the	early-to-mid-2000s	that	would,	in	theory,	see	donors	provide	more	direct	budget	support	to	government.	There	appears	to	have	been	consensus	among	local	technocrats	and	bilateral	agencies	that	abolition	of	a	central	planning	body	had	had	numerous	negative	repercussions	for	aid	dispersal,	such	as	increased	administrative	costs,	duplication	of	projects,	and	little	to	no	monitoring	and	evaluation.			With	regard	to	the	internal	drivers	of	the	reintroduction	of	planning,	two	inter-related	explanations	were	considered	important:	one	political	and	one	ideological.	Put	another	way,	a	particular	confluence	of	political	interests	and	economic	ideas	in	the	early-2000s	left	the	government	of	Levy	Mwanawasa	favourably	disposed	to	the	reintroduction	of	planning.	With	limited	political	support	on	taking	office	–	and	facing	widespread	disaffection	with	the	extensive	liberalisation	implemented	by	his	party	in	the	preceding	decade	–	the	reintroduction	of	planning	offered	Mwanawasa	the	means	to	boost	his	legitimacy	among	the	electorate.	Additionally,	the	idea	of	development	planning	was	one	of	the	resources	used	by	Mwanawasa	to	build	a	coalition	of	political	actors	from	outside	the	MMD	that	would	shore	up	his	political	power	relative	to	ex-president	Chiluba.				
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More	broadly,	this	paper	has	chartered	the	rise,	fall,	and	return	of	planning	in	Zambia.	The	use	of	the	word	‘return’	suggests	that	development	planning	has	enjoyed	something	of	a	homecoming	of	late.	A	cursory	review	would	suggest	that	African	states	are	beginning	to	pick	up	the	mantle	of	developmentalism	that	was	so	thoroughly	dropped	in	the	adjustment	era.	This	is,	for	example,	the	view	put	forward	by	a	2016	UNECA	report:		
Despite	a	brief	interruption	during	the	structural	adjustment	programme	
era	the	most	recent	decade	[2005-2015]	has	witnessed	a	resurgence	of	
development	planning	and	an	evolution	from	its	focus	on	poverty	reduction	
to	a	renewed	emphasis	on	structural	economic	transformation.	In	a	sense,	
the	focus	of	planning	has	come	full	circle,	and	has	returned	to	the	post-
independence	vision	of	structural	transformation.318		On	closer	analysis,	this	conclusion	is	not	an	accurate	description	of	the	reintroduction	of	planning	in	Zambia.	This	chapter’s	review	of	the	FNDP,	and	the	political	and	economic	context	in	which	it	was	implemented,	suggests	that	any	vision	of	structural	transformation	mentioned	in	the	FNDP	–	or	by	politicians	or	technocrats	at	the	time	–	was	purely	rhetorical.	Instead,	rather	than	representing	a	modern-day	renewal	of	developmentalism,	the	FNDP	represents	a	continuation	of	the	neoliberal	populism	of	the	PRSPs.	The	term	‘neoliberal	populism’	was	first	used	by	Weyland	to	discuss	periods	of	radical	adjustment	in	South	America	and	Eastern	Europe	in	the	1990s.319	Gould	has	used	it	to	describe	the	PRSPs’	attempted	use	of	social	sector	spending	and	safety	nets	to	alleviate	some	of	the	costs	of	adjustment	(such	as	poverty	and	unemployment).320 			Arguably,	the	core	function	of	a	development	plan	is	to	define	a	strategy	for	the	allocation	of	resources	for	public	investments	that	would	yield	development-orientated	outcomes	at	some	point	in	the	future.	In	the	post-independence	era,	this	strategy	mostly	took	the	form	of	Import	Substitution	Industrialisation	that	utilised	export	revenues	to	finance	state-run	infant	industries,	such	as	manufacturing,	construction,	communication,	and	transport.	To	this	end,	the	First	NDP	1966-1970	allocated	an	average	of	20%	of	GDP	to	capital	expenditure	annually.	In	comparison,	the	FNDP	allocated	an	average	of	7%	of	GDP	annually	to	public	investments.	It	is	instructive	to	note	that	over	the	FNDP	period,	the	7%	target	was	not	met	–	actual	capital	expenditure	averaged	just	3.7%.321	The	government	did	not	have	the	resources	to	meet	its	unambitious	investment	
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targets.	According	to	the	Sixth	NDP,	there	are	at	least	three	main	reasons	for	this:322		1) Despite	a	planned	reduction	in	current	spending	from	18.5%	of	GDP	to	17.5%	of	GDP	over	the	FNDP	period,	current	expenditure	actually	increased	to	an	average	of	19.2%	annually	over	the	period.	Some	of	the	reasons	for	this	increase	in	current	expenditure	included	the	2006	elections	and	a	growth	in	remuneration	of	civil	servants.		2) Expected	increases	in	domestically	generated	revenues	did	not	materialise,	resulting	in	an	inability	to	cover	current	spending	through	internally	generated	revenues	alone.	Deficit	financing	intended	for	investments	was,	therefore,	partly	utilised	for	current	spending	instead.		3) Lower	than	expected	ODA	from	bilateral	agencies.	The	specific	reasons	for	this	are	not	made	clear,	but	aid	flows	to	Zambia	did	decline	over	decade	due	in	part	to	sustained	growth.			Hinfelaar	and	Sichone	refer	to	the	MoFNP	under	Magande	as	a	relative	‘Pocket	of	Effectiveness’	–	a	ministry	that	executes	the	majority	of	its	functions	satisfactorily,	compared	to	other	under-performing	and	under-capacitated	ministries	in	government.323	General	budget	performance	improved	vastly	under	Magande.	Nevertheless,	the	MoFNP	was	still	politically	weak	in	that	it	was	unable	to	affect	financial	management	in	other	ministries.324	This	partly	explains	the	increase	in	current	expenditure	mentioned	above.	Hinfelaar	and	Sichone	also	note	that	Magande	enjoyed	a	high-degree	of	‘embedded	autonomy’	–	the	freedom	to	execute	his	duties	without	political	interference	from	the	executive.325	However,	in	some	instances	–	such	as	the	2006	elections	and	the	payroll	increases	–	matters	of	political	expedience	clearly	trumped	Magande’s	fiscal	discipline.			Mkandawire	notes	that	state	capacity	can	be	discussed	in	terms	of	a	state’s	ability	to	collect	revenue	and	execute	expenditure.326	Government’s	inability	to	meet	the	target	for	internally	generated	revenue	set	in	the	FNPD	appears	to	speak	to	a	somewhat	weakened	capacity	in	this	regard.	This	can	be	viewed	as	part	of	a	wider	decline	in	government’s	extractive	capacity	(its	ability	to	collect	tax	revenue)	that	accompanied	the	adjustment	of	the	1990s.	The	large	bureaucratic	capacity	established	after	independence	had,	to	a	large	extent,	been	
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dismantled	under	the	Chiluba	administration.	Additionally,	privatisation	and	liberal	reforms	to	the	tax	code	meant	that	government’s	largest	income	–	revenue	from	copper	exports	–	declined	between	2000	and	2008,	despite	a	total	increase	in	export	revenue	from	$670	million	to	$4	billion	over	the	same	period.327		A	decline	in	extractive	capacity	appears	to	be	common	to	all	African	mineral	resource	exporters	that	underwent	adjustment.	Campbell	notes	that	the	BWI-led	reforms	to	the	mining	code	in	these	countries	created	a	favourable	environment	for	foreign	investment	but	fundamentally	changed	the	role	of	the	state	and	its	relation	to	both	markets	and	society.328		Campbell	argues	that	the	liberal	reforms	of	the	adjustment	era	“tended	to	favour	a	weakening	of	the	fiscal	basis	of	the	state”,	thereby	reducing	the	state’s	ability	to	regulate	the	private	sector,	collect	revenue,	and	distribute	resources.329			Additionally,	these	reforms	left	African	commodities	exporters	more	thoroughly	integrated	into	the	global	economy	and	more	dependent	on	the	prices	received	on	international	markets.330	This	is	certainly	true	in	Zambia’s	case.	Copper	accounted	for	an	annual	average	of	77%	of	exports	over	the	FNDP	period	(2006-2010),	compared	to	an	annual	average	of	61%	over	the	period	2002-2005.331				Moreover,	the	economic	structure	of	most	African	countries	has	not	changed	since	the	beginning	of	the	adjustment	era	in	the	1980s.332	If	anything,	the	economies	of	African	primary	goods	exporters	have	become	more,	not	less,	specialised	in	production	for	export.333	Again,	this	is	true	in	Zambia’s	case.	The	MTEF	2008-2010,	for	example,	notes	that	growth	between	2005	and	2007	averaged	5.6%	annually.	In	the	next	sentence,	the	MTEF	makes	the	following	observation:		
However,	this	has	translated	into	a	modest	reduction	in	poverty	as	the	
majority	of	the	Zambians	still	remain	poor.	This,	to	a	large	extent	can	be	
explained	by	the	growth	that	has	largely	emanated	from	the	mining	sector	
which	has	little	impact	on	the	majority	of	the	population	who	are	mainly	in	
the	agriculture	sector.334		
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The	introduction	to	the	Sixth	National	Development	Plan	2011-2015	similarly	concludes:			
The	economic	growth	experienced	during	the	last	decade	has	not	translated	
into	significant	reductions	in	poverty	and	improved	general	living	
conditions	of	the	majority	of	the	Zambians.	Job	creation	was	not	
commensurate	with	the	gains	registered	from	economic	growth.335		The	SNDP	goes	on	to	explain	that	the	growth	was	centred	on	the	mining	industry,	which	is	highly	capital	intensive	and	has	few	productive	linkages	to	the	rest	of	the	economy.	As	a	result	of	the	reforms	implemented	under	the	auspices	of	the	BWIs	in	the	1990s	and	the	2000s,	the	mining	industry	enclave	became	even	more	isolated	from	the	local	economy	and	from	the	state	itself.	Jerven	contrasts	the	growth	on	the	continent	during	the	2000s	with	that	of	the	1960s	and	early-to-mid-1970s.336	He	notes	that	in	the	immediate	post-independence	era,	growth	was	not	driven	solely	by	the	external	sector.	Rather,	growth	in	the	external	sector	was	matched	by	growth	in	the	domestic	economy.	This	would	suggest	that	government	had	some	success	at	the	time	in	transferring	resources	from	export	revenue	to	industrialisation	and	a	growing	civil	service.			Chapter	Two	argued	that	the	definition	of	a	developmental	state	had	both	an	ideological	and	a	structural	component.	Despite	Mwanawasa’s	occasionally	nationalist	rhetoric	and	the	reintroduction	of	planning,	his	administration’s	economic	policy-making	was	guided	more	by	austerity	and	fiscal	consolidation	than	by	developmentalism.	Arguably,	scrapping	the	DAs	in	2008	represented	more	of	a	turn	towards	developmentalism	than	the	reintroduction	of	planning	did.	Hinfelaar	and	Sichone,	for	example,	note	that	the	changes	in	the	mining	regulations	indicate	a	turn	toward	“resource	nationalism”	in	the	Mwanawasa	administration,	where	government	attempted	to	assert	greater	control	of	the	mining	industry	and	increase	revenues	from	the	sector.337	Although,	it	is	possible	that	this	shift	towards	resource	nationalism	was	part	of	a	response	to	domestic	political	pressures	more	than	anything	else.338	In	any	case,	this	shift	in	economic	policy-making	was	short-lived.	Following	Mwanawasa’s	death	in	August	2008	and	the	global	financial	crisis,	a	new	MMD	administration	under	Rupiah	Banda	repealed	the	windfall	tax	in	2009	in	the	hopes	of	luring	investors	into	the	country.			Additionally,	the	Mwanawasa	administration	was	structurally	unable	to	play	a	more	activist	role	in	the	economy,	even	if	it	had	wanted	to.	Firstly,	it	was	‘hemmed-in’	by	the	burden	of	debt	accrued	by	the	previous	government	under	the	tutelage	of	the	BWIs.	Secondly,	a	large	proportion	of	its	administrative	capacity	developed	after	independence	had	been	dismantled	during	the	liberalisation	of	the	1990s.	This	severely	undermined	the	state’s	ability	to	gather	
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and	distribute	resources.	The	BWI-led	changes	to	the	country’s	mining	regulation	in	the	early-2000s	were	particularly	deleterious	in	this	regard.	This	reduction	in	state	capacity	occurred	simultaneously	with	a	deregulation	of	trade	and	an	opening	of	the	domestic	market,	which	resulted	in	increased	dependence	on	copper	exports	and	heightened	exposure	to	the	volatility	of	the	international	commodities	market.	The	Mwanawasa	administration	restored	stability	to	the	economy	and	the	fiscus,	and	oversaw	a	period	of	significant	and	sustained	growth.	Driven	by	the	enclave	mining	economy,	however,	this	growth	had	practically	no	discernible	effect	on	poverty	and	employment.			Therefore,	the	reintroduction	of	development	planning	in	Zambia	does	not	represent	a	resurgence	of	the	developmentalism	that	characterised	the	post-independence	era	of	growth.	The	FNDP	was	certainly	not	an	attempt	to	achieve	long-term	structural	change.	Rather,	it	reflects	a	continuation	of	the	neoliberal	populism	introduced	by	the	PRSPs	i.e.	a	–	failed	–	attempt	to	make	adjustment	more	palatable	and	less	obviously	costly	to	vulnerable	groups	in	society.	 	
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Chapter Four: Conclusion  	This	study	investigated	the	reasons	why	the	MMD	government	reinstated	planning	in	2002	after	having	scrapped	it	a	decade	previously	in	1991.	The	return	of	development	planning	in	Zambia	occurred	at	the	beginning	of	a	wider	trend	in	development	that	gained	momentum	globally	in	the	late-2000s	and	2010s	–	the	rise	of	the	‘new’	development	planning.	More	broadly,	Chapter	One	situated	the	‘new’	planning	in	a	periodisation	of	development	planning	on	the	African	continent:			
• Post-independence	national	development	planning	–	late-1950s,	1960s,	and	early	1970s	
• Structural	adjustment	and	stabilisation	–	1980s	and	early	1990s	
• Poverty	reduction	strategies	–	late-1990s,	early-2000s	
• ‘New’	national	development	planning	–	mid-2000s,	2010s		These	periods	were	broadly	defined	by	changes	in	development	ideology	and	practice.	The	use	of	the	term	‘ideology’	here	refers	to	the	economic	and	technical	ideas	related	to	the	theory	and	practice	of	development.	These	ideas	had	important	consequences	for	policy-making	in	developing	countries,	as	they	usually	defined	a	general	consensus	on	what	governments	could	and	should	do.			Chapter	One	also	presented	a	brief	economic	history	of	Africa.	Two	points	are	relevant	here.	Firstly,	on	average,	most	African	countries	displayed	significant	and	persistent	growth	in	the	1960s	and	early-to-mid-1970s.	During	this	time,	several	states,	including	Zambia,	made	commendable	strides	in	the	areas	of	development	and	nation	building.	This	was	achieved	by	making	large	public	investments	in	social	services,	infrastructure,	and	the	civil	service.	This	point	has	largely	been	lost	in	the	general	tendency	of	development	economics	to	focus	on	explaining	the	apparent	failure	of	African	economies	since	the	late-1970s.	The	second	point	relates	to	the	structure	of	a	large	number	of	African	economies	and	their	integration	into	world	markets.	After	independence,	many	of	them	turned	to	their	comparative	advantage	in	producing	primary	goods	to	finance	nation-building	efforts.	Since	then,	these	countries	have	become	ever	more	reliant	on	the	export	of	commodities	–	agricultural	and/or	mineral	–	for	the	foreign	reserves	needed	to	purchase	manufactured	goods.	The	result,	in	terms	of	policy-making	at	least,	is	that	national	budgets	have	become	increasingly	exposed	to	the	volatility	of	international	commodity	markets.	As	Zambia’s	history	shows,	drops	in	international	commodity	prices	can	lead	to	immediate	budgetary	and	current	account	crises	that	have	widespread	consequences	for	the	economy	as	a	whole.			Chapter	Two	located	the	decision	to	abandon	planning	in	the	wider	political	and	economic	changes	that	were	occurring	in	Zambia	around	the	time	of	the	
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country’s	first	multiparty	elections.	Essentially,	planning	was	discarded	in	government’s	rush	to	liberalise	the	economy	and	attain	BWI	financing.	The	decision	was	taken	almost	immediately	after	the	MMD	took	power.	The	planning	body,	the	NCDP,	was	first	tasked	with	creating	short-term	investment	plans	in	1992	before	eventually	being	scrapped	completely	in	1994.	In	a	sense,	the	new	government	viewed	development	planning	as	an	anachronism	–	an	unnecessary	policy	tool	left	over	from	the	supposedly	‘statist’	and	‘socialist’	Kaunda	era.			The	MMD	inherited	a	devastated	economy.	For	at	least	fifteen	years	prior	to	multiparty	elections,	the	economy	had	steadily	declined	while	associated	social	costs,	such	as	unemployment	and	poverty,	increased	relentlessly.	In	part,	this	is	due	to	a	continually	suppressed	external	environment	and	the	associated	poor	terms	of	trade.	It	is	also	partly	due	to	Kaunda’s	eschewal	of	prudent	macroeconomic	and	fiscal	policies	in	favour	of	maintaining	his	networks	of	political	patronage.	By	the	time	the	MMD	took	power,	foreign	reserves	were	virtually	wiped	out,	government	was	unable	to	pay	for	most	imports,	and	massive	debt	had	led	to	unsustainable	servicing	costs.			In	a	sense,	then,	the	new	government	was	‘hemmed	in’	with	no	other	feasible	options	but	to	turn	the	BWIs.	However,	key	decision-makers	–	like	the	president	and	minister	of	finance	–	certainly	approached	the	BWIs	as	‘willing	and	sympathetic	interlocutors’.	It	is	within	this	context	that	planning	was	abandoned	as	a	soft	condition	of	BWI	lending.	The	BWIs	had	mentioned	it	several	times	in	their	engagements	with	government	in	the	late-1980s	and	early-1990s.	It	was	recommended	that	vital	capacity	should	not	be	wasted	on	creating	vague	long-term	plans.	Rather,	planning	was	only	necessary	to	the	extent	that	it	was	concerned	with	short-term	budgeting	–	mainly	expenditure	control	and	containing	fiscal	deficits.	In	this	sense,	the	abandonment	of	planning	can	be	seen	as	collateral	damage	of	the	unbridled	economic	liberalisation	that	the	MMD	embarked	upon	in	the	early-1990s.			The	political	reforms	begun	at	the	same	time	were	not	nearly	as	wide-reaching	as	their	economic	counterparts.	In	fact,	the	liberal	economic	reforms	of	the	1990s	were	occurring	in	a	context	of	stalling	political	liberalisation.	The	constitutional	amendment	signed	by	Kaunda	in	1990	allowed	opposition	parties	to	be	created	and	to	contest	elections,	but	Zambia	became	a	multiparty	political	system	in	name	only.	It	would	be	more	accurately	described	as	a	dominant-party	system	where	the	ruling	party	and	the	president	held	unrivalled	power.	From	1993,	it	had	become	apparent	that	Chiluba	was	attempting	to	cement	his	political	power	by	building	a	patronage-based	political	coalition	similar	to	those	created	under	Kaunda	in	the	First	and	Second	Republics.			
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Further,	while	the	MMD	had	an	overwhelming	mandate	to	implement	liberal	economic	reforms,	there	was	no	consensus	within	the	party	on	how,	in	what	sequence,	and	–	in	some	cases	-	whether	the	reforms	should	be	implemented.	Nevertheless,	with	the	support	of	the	president,	Ministers	of	Finance	Kasonde	(1991-1993)	and	Penza	(1993-1998)	were	able	to	implement	a	liberal	economic	reform	programme	that	was	more	extensive	and	rapid	than	almost	anywhere	else	on	the	continent.			Chapter	Two	also	argued	that	the	discarding	of	planning	was	significant	as	it	represented	an	unprecedented	break	with	the	developmentalism	of	the	Kaunda	era.	The	MMD	oversaw	a	transition	from	a	developmental	state	to	the	new	adjustment-era	night-watchman	state.	It	could	perhaps	be	argued	that	this	particular	transition	had	begun	earlier	in	the	1980s,	as	Kaunda	twice	suspended	planning	upon	signing	loan	agreements	with	the	IMF.	Nevertheless,	the	MMD	would	ensure	that	this	transition	was	definitive.	Development	was	no	longer	tied	to	issues	of	nation	building.	It	was	now	believed	to	be	“immanent”	in	the	market,	and	all	that	was	required	of	the	state	was	to	ensure	the	efficient	functioning	of	the	market.339	On	the	whole,	this	led	a	dramatic	–	yet	asymmetrical	–	reduction	in	state	capacity	in	Zambia	and	in	African	countries	in	general.	The	‘agencies	of	restraint’	–	the	ministry	of	finance,	central	bank,	receiver,	etc.	–	were	generally	empowered	relative	to	the	‘spending	agencies’,	which	were	constrained.340			The	main	aim	of	Chapter	Three	was	to	explore	the	reasons	for	the	reintroduction	of	planning	in	2002.	As	previously	discussed,	the	current	literature	on	development	planning	is	limited.	Chimhowu	et	al.	have	been	the	first	to	describe	the	return	of	development	planning	as	a	clear	trend	in	emerging	countries	around	the	world.341	They	attempt	to	characterise	the	‘new’	development	planning	and	to	provide	explanations	for	its	return	in	developing	countries.	The	chapter	found	in	favour	of	their	argument	that	the	PRSPs	have	acted	as	precursors	to	the	‘new’	development	plans	in	post-HIPC	programmes.		Chapter	Three	argued	that	the	reinstatement	of	planning	in	Zambia	had	both	external	and	internal	drivers.	Regarding	the	former,	a	national	development	plan	that	was	approved	by	international	lenders	and	aid	agencies	was	seen	as	a	crucial	tool	for	streamlining	aid	inflows	and	reducing	administrative	costs	for	recipient	countries.	Regarding	the	internal	drivers,	Chapter	Three	investigated	how	political	interests	and	economic	ideas	influenced	the	return	of	planning	in	Zambia.	This	argument	built	on	work	of	authors	like	Blyth,	Sikkink,	and	Woods,	
 
339 Thandika Mkandawire, "From maladjusted states to democratic developmental states in Africa," 
Constructing a democratic develomental state in South Africa  (2010): 62. 
340 "State Capacity, History, Structure, and Political Contestation in Africa," 186. 
341 Chimhowu, Hulme, and Munro, "The ‘new’ national development planning and global development 
goals: Processes and partnerships." 
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arguing	that	ideas	shape	the	perimeters	within	which	political	interests	are	formed.342	Economic	ideas	allow	actors	to	explain	and	criticise	past	policy	failures	and	to	suggest	courses	of	future	action.	In	this	way	economic	ideas	act	as	coalition	builders	in	times	of	uncertainty.	They	assist	actors	in	making	sense	of	a	political-economic	situation	and	create	the	conditions	under	which	collective	action	is	possible.			The	idea	of	a	development-orientated	and	technocratic	government	formed	the	basis	of	the	political	coalition	that	Mwanawasa	built	in	the	months	following	his	2001	electoral	victory.	For	him,	the	reintroduction	of	planning	served	two	purposes.	First,	it	helped	to	boost	his	political	legitimacy	after	having	won	a	divisive,	and	most	likely	fraudulent,	election	in	2001.	Secondly,	with	virtually	no	support	within	his	own	party,	it	helped	him	to	establish	a	political	coalition	of	outsiders	that	would	cement	his	political	support	relative	to	a	faction	led	by	former	president	Chiluba.			Importantly,	Chapter	Three	also	argued	that	the	FNDP	2006-2010	adhered	more	closely	to	the	‘neoliberal	populism’	of	the	PRSPs	than	to	the	developmentalism	of	the	immediate	post-independence	years.	In	short,	the	rise	of	the	‘new’	planning	in	Zambia	was	not	accompanied	by	a	concurrent	rise	of	‘new’	developmentalism.	In	practice,	this	resulted	in	continued	adjustment	with	increased	social	sector	spending	in	an	attempt	to	alleviate	the	attendant	costs	experienced	by	vulnerable	groups.			The	adjustment	overseen	by	the	Mwanawasa	administration	was	not	entirely	unsuccessful.	Under	Magande,	with	Mwanawasa’s	support,	performance	at	the	MoFNP	improved	significantly.	The	Mwanawasa	administration	had	managed,	to	a	large	degree,	to	restore	macroeconomic	and	budgetary	stability.	It	also	oversaw	the	economy’s	first	sustained	period	of	growth	since	the	1970s.	Unlike	the	immediate	post-independence	era	of	development,	this	growth	period	was	driven	entirely	by	increased	specialisation	in	the	production	of	copper	for	export.	Problematically,	the	liberalisation	of	the	1990s	had	further	isolated	the	mining	sector	from	the	domestic	economy.	As	a	result,	the	Zambian	economy	saw	limited	positive	spill-overs	from	the	commodities	boom	and	concurrent	growth.	There	was	neither	increased	domestic	revenue	nor	reduction	in	poverty	and	unemployment	rates.	Set	against	this	background,	it	becomes	apparent	that	the	FNDP	carried	more	weight	as	a	political	tool	than	an	effective	technical	policy	document.			
 
342 Blyth, Great transformations: Economic ideas and institutional change in the twentieth century; 
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The	era	of	“big	ideas”	of	development	is	over.343	The	international	development	industry	no	longer	advocates	for	‘one-size-fits-all’	policies	and	there	has	been	recognition	that	individual	countries	face	unique	developmental	challenges	that	will	require	varied	policy	responses.344	This	is	accompanied	by	a	general	understanding	that	developing	countries	should	play	the	leading	role	in	their	own	development	efforts	–	to	‘take	the	wheel’	as	it	were.		In	this	light,	as	Chimhowu	et	al.	note,	the	rise	of	the	new	planning	is	a	welcome	development.	While	not	disagreeing	with	this	sentiment,	the	case	study	presented	here	suggests	that	this	enthusiasm	may	have	to	be	tempered	somewhat.	Or	at	least,	it	suggests	that	more	work	needs	to	be	done	to	understand	what	the	rise	of	the	‘new’	planning	actually	means	for	developing	countries	in	general	and	for	African	countries	in	particular.	Put	differently,	it	suggests	that	more	needs	to	be	done	in	order	to	understand	the	extent	to	which	the	rise	of	the	‘new’	planning	represents	legitimate	attempts	by	emerging	countries	to	‘take	the	wheel’	of	their	own	development.			 	
 
343 David L Lindauer et al., "What's the Big Idea? The Third Generation of Policies for Economic 
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